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A Swedish economic policy was developed by two trade union economists shortly after the 
Second World War. The Rehn-Meidner model recommends the use of selective employment 
policy measures, a tight macroeconomic policy and a wage policy of solidarity to combine 
full  employment  and  equity  with  price  stability  and  economic  growth.  Although  never 
consistently  applied  in  Sweden,  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  a  golden  age  for  the  Rehn-
Meidner model from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. In the 1970s and 1980s, Swedish 
governments  abandoned  the  restrictive  macroeconomic  means  of  the  Rehn-Meidner 
programme and decentralised wage bargaining obstructed the wage policy of solidarity. In the 
1990s and 2000s a new economic-policy regime could not meet the strong requirement of full 
employment  in  the  Rehn-Meidner  model  but  it  satisfied  the  model’s  priority  of  selective 
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The Rehn-Meidner model (R-M model) is a unique Swedish contribution to macroeconomics. 
Two trade union economists – Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner – advocated an active labour 
market  policy,  a  wages  policy  of  solidarity  and  a  restrictive  macroeconomic  policy  – 
primarily indirect taxes – to combine full employment with fair wages, price stability and 
high economic growth. The programme was presented in a report to the 1951 congress of LO, 
the central organisation for blue-collar workers in Sweden (LO, 1953). Rudolf Meidner was 
the head of LO’s research department 1946-1966 and Gösta Rehn the department’s leading 
macroeconomist 1941-1952.  
 
Erixon  (2008)  scrutinizes  the  efficiency  of  the  R-M  instruments  and  the  validity  of  the 
model’s underlying economic theory in light of Sweden’s macroeconomic development in the 
post-war period. The aim of this paper is to analyse whether the R-M policy model was 
actually applied in Sweden until the fall of 2006. For the third time in the post-war period a 
social democratic government was then replaced by a centre-right coalition government. This 
paper also uses the R-M model as a point of reference for a description of Sweden’s economic 
policy in the post-war period. Another purpose of this paper is to distinguish the economic-
structural  and  political-institutional  conditions,  ideologies,  power  relations,  economic 
paradigms and economic-policy experiences underlying the application of and also departure 
from the R-M model in Sweden. This analysis is more comprehensive than the corresponding 
account of the model in practice.  
 
The following inquiry into Swedish economic and wage policy, with a particular eye on the 
R-M model, is based on official statistics and reports (including budget bills of Sweden) and 




contribution  to  statistics  is  a  survey  of  Swedish  labour  market  policy  1965-2005  and  a 
description of trends in profits shares in 10 OECD countries (including Sweden) 1955-2003 
(see  Appendix).  The  study  is  both  historical  and  country-comparative  albeit  without  any 
systematic  comparison  between  Sweden  and  countries  that  are  similar  in  terms  of  size, 
openness, industrial composition or political institutions.  
 
The analysis of the application of the R-M model is not without complications. An economic 
and wages policy in conformity with the model does not necessarily mean that it itself has 
guided decision makers. Swedish politicians might have been governed by economic-policy 
models, in some respects similar to the R-M model. Neither do politicians’ references to the 
model ex post prove that it really had any influence over the economic policy during the 
period under review. Another problem when analysing the application of the R-M model is 
that its fathers do not provide an unambiguous blueprint for the design of macroeconomic 
policy (fiscal and monetary policy) for a recession. The model was basically formulated for an 
overheated economy and for the medium term. However, difficulties defining the content and 
influence of the R-M programme have not stopped me from drawing some conclusions about 
its applicability in Sweden. The R-M model was never fully and consciously applied, but it is 
possible to speak of a “golden age” for the model from the end of the 1950s up to the first oil 
crisis in 1973-1974. 
 
Section  2  presents  the  R-M  policy  programme.  Section  3  outlines  the  application  of  a 
Keynesian economic policy in Sweden during the early post-war years. Section 4 analyses the 
golden age of the R-M model. Section 5 studies the period from the mid-1970s up to the deep 
economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s with major external challenges to, and some 




model  under  a  new  economic-policy  regime  emphasising  price  stability,  Central  Bank 
independence and strict targets for monetary and fiscal policy.  
 
2. The essence of the Rehn-Meidner model  
A restrictive fiscal policy in the medium term (over the business cycle)  was  the  original 
instrument  to  curb  inflation  in  the  the  R-M  model.  Revaluation  and  restrictive  monetary 
policy are other R-M measures to combat inflation.
1 The aim of a restrictive macroeconomic 
policy  in  the  R-M  model  is  to  prevent  price  increases  when  nominal  wage  growth  is 
maintained by a selective policy of full employment (see below). Rehn and Meidner also 
suggested  that  this  policy  combination  would  have  a  wage-restraining  effect  from  the 
corresponding squeeze on profit margins.
2 High expected profits from recruiting labour and 
high actual profit margins lead, they argued, to widespread wage drift, i.e. to wage increases 
outside  central  agreements,  in  leading  wage  sectors;  in  Sweden  the  exposed  sector  has 
generally been wage-leading in the post-war period. Wage drift at the initiative of employers 
will induce compensatory demands from wage earners experiencing moderate wage drift to 
recapture earlier relative-wage positions.  
 
In the R-M model a restrictive economic policy over the business cycle does not exclude 
countercyclical fiscal policy, or even an underbalanced public budget, in a period of low 
                                         
1 In the debate between him and Erik Lundberg, Rehn had first criticized the use of monetary measures in 
stabilisation policies. He considered the policy of permanently low rates of interest in Sweden in the early post-
war period the most suitable monetary policy (Rehn, 1952a, pp. 51-2 and 1952b, pp. 75-6). But already in the 
1951 LO report Rehn placed restrictive monetary policy almost on an equal footing with contractionary fiscal 
policy (LO, 1953, pp. 84 and 90-1, see also Rehn, 1969, pp. 164-6 and 169-70 and 1977, p. 223). 
 
2 High profit margins, Rehn and Meidner argued, would boost firms’ financial capacity to bid up wages for 
scarce labour. They also thought that high profit margins would increase firms’ willingness (and ability) to pay 
X-inefficient wages, thus wages above (marginal) labour productivity (Rehn, 1952a, pp. 32-43; LO, 1953, pp. 
92-3; Hansen and Rehn, 1956, p. 89; Rehn, 1969, pp. 163 and 170 and 1987, pp. 65-8; Erixon, 2000, pp. 25-9 
and 2001, pp. 23-4). Rehn and Meidner maintained further, like today’s efficiency-wage theorists, that higher 
profits accruing to firms’  owners would provoke  higher wage claims. However, Rehn and Meidner seldom 




economic activity. A reasonable interpretation of the R-M model is that it suggests a selective 
employment policy together with countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy including the 
possibility of intentional public budget deficits during a deep recession (depression). For a 
“normal” (or weak) recession the model recommends selective employment stimuli within the 
framework of a monetary and fiscal policy that is neutral or restrictive.
3 The difficulty of 
analysing the application of the model’s monetary and fiscal policy lies, of course, in deciding 
whether a recession has been severe or not.  
 
The Rehn-Meidner model advocates a restrictive fiscal policy in the medium term not only to 
reduce inflation – this policy should also, by contributing to a decline in profit margins, alter 
functional income distribution in favour of labour and increase public saving at the expense of 
company saving. Rehn and Meidner favoured public saving on equity, and also on industrial-
policy,  grounds.
4  These  objectives  make  public  saving  the  least  market-conforming 
component of the R-M model. Rehn and Meidner also expected that lower profit margins 
(reduced  markups  or  intra-marginal  profits)  would  stimulate  total  factor  productivity  by 
speeding  up  rationalisation  and  the elimination of  production  units  with  low  productivity 
levels or low productivity growth; productivity is particularly stimulated if low-productivity 
firms and industries are hit by a combination of a general decline in profit margins and a wage 
policy of solidarity (see below).  
 
                                                                                                                               
these demands for higher wages on equity grounds (see, however, Hansen and Rehn, 1956, p. 90 and Rehn, 
1987, p. 76).  
 
3 The 1951 report contains no reservations when recommending countercyclical fiscal policy - an underbalanced 
public budget may be necessary to keep full employment (LO, 1953, p. 91). Rehn also claimed in other works 
that the price stabilising effects of an overbalanced budget in the medium term would indeed increase the scope 
for public budget deficits. But it seems that Rehn only recommended a fiscal policy leading to public budget 
deficits provided that the recession is deep (see Rehn, 1952a, p. 52, 1952b, p. 76, 1969, pp. 166 and 180, 1977, p. 
213 and 1982, pp. 1-3, 8, 18 and 26). 
 




In the R-M model active labour market policies including marginal employment subsidies are 
the  main  instruments  to  prevent  unemployment  from  rising  in  the  wake  of  a  restrictive 
macroeconomic  policy.  Rehn  expected  that  marginal  employment  subsidies,  which  he 
enthusiastically argued for from the 1970s, would reduce prices and also contribute to lower 
inflation  by the subsequent  squeeze of profit margins for firms that do  not qualify for  a 
subsidy. Rehn suggested that employment subsidies could be permanent and universal, thus 
not restricted to some groups in the labour market or to some sectors.
5 In the original R-M 
model full employment with a high level of ambition – open unemployment at least below 3 
per cent - is guaranteed by supply-side measures on the labour market (retraining, vocational 
education and relocation grants), matching actions (primarily public information services) and 
targeted demand-oriented policies to increase demand for labour in certain regions, industries 
and firms. In fact, these measures explain why nominal wages are rigid downwards in the 
model. The propensity of labour market policy to reduce wage increases by making labour 
markets more effective and wage earners more productive is offset by the policy’s tendency to 
keep  up  wages  by  preventing  open  unemployment.
6  However,  in  the  R-M  model,  the 
subsequent decline in profit margins is a weapon in the fight against inflation.  
 
The term “selective employment policy” is often used (e.g. in this paper) to distinguish the R-
M model from a Keynesian model. But the term is misleading for the marginal employment 
subsidies and also for the supply and adjustment (mobility-enhancing) measures of the R-M 
model; these measures should  be universal, thus not target  specific groups on the labour 
market, for example unemployed persons. Formulations, for example in the 1951 LO report, 
point  to Rehn  and  Meidner  putting  greater  emphasis  on  supply  and  adjustment  measures 
(mobility-enhancing policies) than on job-creation measures (LO, 1953, pp. 92-3). Labour 
                                         




market policy serves the purpose not only to guarantee low rates of open unemployment and 
to  control  inflation  by  keeping  down  profit  margins;  it  would  also  reduce  inflationary 
bottlenecks in the labour market and foster structural change. Rehn’s argument for mobility-
enhancing labour market policy and high ambitions in employment policy was also based on 
his specific notion of individual freedom. “Security of wings” would give the individual more 
freedom and power in relation to corporations than “security under shells”, that is laws and 
collective agreements on job security.    
 
A  specific  task  of  mobility-enhancing  labour  market  policies,  and  also  of  restrictive 
macroeconomic  policies,  is  to  back  up  the  wage  policy  of  solidarity.  A  wage  policy  of 
solidarity through coordinated wage negotiations implies that employees with similar jobs are 
paid the same wage regardless of the profit situation of firms and industries. Wage differences 
should reflect differences in working environment and job content, for example differences in 
skill. In fact, solidarity wage policy is an instrument anticipating a long-run equilibrium in 
perfect labour markets (Rehn, 1969, p. 165). In the R-M model the wage policy of solidarity 
is also a “fair” instrument of economic growth. Low-productivity firms and plants that cannot 
bear solidarity wages must rationalise or disappear, freeing resources for the expansion of 
dynamic firms.
7 Furthermore, in the R-M model, solidarity wage policy would play a part in 
the struggle against inflation. This wage policy is supposed to hold back wage increases in 
profitable companies willing and able to pay higher wages than solidaristic ones. Rehn and 
Meidner  also  thought  that  the  establishment  of  a  “rational”  (fair)  wage  structure  would 
mitigate inflationary wage-wage spirals, which tend to appear when unions try to increase or 
                                                                                                                               
6 Rehn, 1952a, p. 32, 1977, p. 212 and 1982, p. 44; LO, 1953, pp. 46-9 and 99; Rehn, 1987, p. 67, see also 
Erixon, 2000, pp. 38-40 and 67 and Erixon, 2008. 
 
7 In the 1951 LO report the notion of rationalisation is broad, including the elimination of production slacks (the 
definition used throughout this paper), organisational changes, labour substitution and even the adoption of new 




maintain the relative wage levels of their members. However, the wage policy of solidarity 
leads neither to wage stability nor to structural change, if there is no restrictive fiscal policy 
and active labour market policy to reduce overall profits and promote labour mobility.
8  
 
Rehn  and  Meidner  were  of  the  opinion  that  their  policy,  aimed  at  restraining  aggregate 
demand, intensifying price competition, squeezing profit margins and making labour markets 
more effective, was superior to a Keynesian strategy for fighting inflation in an economy 
approaching full employment. (I ignore here the possible inflation-dampening effects of wage 
policy  of  solidarity.)  The  Keynesian  post-war  model  is  connected  in  this  paper  with 
expansionary  macroeconomic  policies,  primarily  demand-stimulating  fiscal  policies  and 
devaluations,  in  combination  with  regulation  and  selective  fiscal  measures  to  conquer 
inflation  and  sustain  low  rates  of  unemployment.  In  the  Keynesian  model,  it  is  mainly 
incomes policy – that is, price controls and wage moderation - that was expected to improve 
the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Rehn and Meidner doubted, primarily by 
reference to wage drift, that incomes policy could prevent high nominal wage increases in a 
situation  where  full  employment  is  elicited  by  high  aggregate  demand.  Furthermore,  the 
Keynesian remedy for inflation is not only ineffective, Rehn and Meidner argued, but also 
counterproductive. Price and investment controls hurt mainly efficient firms and investment 
projects. In addition, wage restraint weakens the willingness of firms to rationalise, if it is at 
all possible for the trade union movement - which Rehn and Meidner doubted - to moderate 
wage demands in an overheated economy. Moreover, they feared that committments to wage 
moderation would generate conflicts between trade unions, between trade union leaders and 
                                         








3. Swedish economic policy before the Rehn-Meidner model 
Already at the beginning of the 1930s, a social democratic government had accepted, and 
partially  also  practised,  the  idea  of  public  budget  deficits  in  a  recession.  The  Stockholm 
school, with Gunnar Myrdal and Bertil Ohlin as prominent spokesmen, contributed to the 
early breakthrough of Keynesian ideas in Sweden. Keynes had emphasised the need of an 
expansionary  fiscal  policy  during  mass  unemployment.  The  Stockholm  school  provided 
arguments for a countercyclical economic policy in general. The ideas of Keynes and the 
Stockholm school had a strong influence on Swedish economic policy immediately after the 
Second World War. Myrdal served as an expert in the committee charged with the task of 
writing the post-war programme of the labour movement (Arbetarrörelsens efterkrigsprogram, 
1944). The LO economist Gösta Rehn was a coordinator of the committee, and consequently 
one of the authors of the programme. The post-war programme was a radical child of the 
Keynesian revolution, showing strong similarities to the “Beveridge plan” (Beveridge, 1944). 
Both programmes recommended investment planning and regulation of capital and product 
markets  (including  some  nationalisation)  to  maintain  peak  levels  of  employment.  They 
intended to fight inflation with the help of incomes policy and other regulations - not through 
a  strict  economic  policy  endangering  full  employment  (Beveridge,  1944,  pp.  198-207; 
Arbetarrörelsens efterkrigsprogram, 1944, pp. 48-9). 
 
The post-war programme of the Swedish labour movement was built upon expectations of a 
coming depression similar to the one a few years after the First World War. But the expected 
                                         




post-war depression did not occur. The rapid reconstruction of Western Europe was very 
favourable to Swedish export industries, which specialized in raw materials, semi-finished 
goods, and investment goods. An export boom, coupled with high domestic investments and a 
pent-up demand for housing and durable consumer goods, led to overheating tendencies in the 
Swedish economy during the second half of the 1940s and the early 1950s. Neither social 
democratic governments, nor the non-socialist opposition, were prepared for the problems of 
economic instability typical of an overheated market economy with its inherent tendency to a 
low rate of unemployment.  
 
Stabilisation policy in Sweden from the end of the Second World War to the end of the 1950s 
showed similarities to the post-war programme of the labour movement and the Beveridge 
plan. Sweden, like many other Western countries, followed an economic-policy programme 
labelled the Keynesian post-war model in this paper. Social democratic governments made 
“full employment” a priority, full employment being more ambitiously defined than during 
the 1930s. They did not use restrictive general economic policy to counteract the tendencies 
towards overheating during the second half of the 1940s and first half of the 1950s.
10 Fiscal 
policy (by general government) was countercyclical but mainly expansionary (cf Matthiesen, 
1971, pp. 176-7). In fact, in 1947, with the support of the LO leadership, a social democratic 
government had abolished general sales taxes as a part of its stabilisation policy. Monetary 
policy was also expansionary until the mid-1950s. A policy of low interest rates - which was 
made possible through monetary regulation – led to a vast increase in liquidity in the Swedish 
economy. 
                                                                                                                               
and 25. 
 
10 Sweden had been ruled by a broad coalition government during the Second World War. Immediately after the 
war, the social democrats formed a one-party government. Between 1951 and 1957, the Social Democratic party 





The government revalued the krona in 1946 in order to weaken inflationary impulses from 
abroad. But after the revaluation, in line with the Beveridge plan and the post-war programme 
of the labour movement, the government undertook a series of extraordinary measures to 
alleviate  overheating  and  improve  the  trade  balance.
11  It  fought  domestic  inflationary 
tendencies  in  1946-1948  through  profit  and  selective  purchase  taxes,  price  controls  and 
regulation  of  the  construction  sector.  Many  measures  were  facilitated  by  regulation 
instruments developed during the war. In 1947, the development of a large current-account 
deficit, due to the revaluation of the krona and the domestic-demand boom, resulted in import 
regulations. In the fall of 1948, the government also managed to persuade LO to accept a 
“wage  stop”  for  1949  (in  effect  a  prolongation  of  the  1948  collective  agreements).  An 
extension of the wage stop until 1950 led to increased tensions between the government and 
LO. These tensions culminated in September 1949 when the government devalued the krona. 
The Swedish devaluation was caused most immediately by the devaluation of the British 
pound. The krona was devalued by 30 per cent in relation to the dollar, and by 13-15 per cent 
in relation to the currencies of Sweden’s main competitors on the export market. Soon after 
the devaluation (in 1950), Sweden joined the Bretton Woods agreement from 1944, which 
stipulated  fixed  exchange  rates,  provided  the  countries  were  not  hit  by  major  external 
imbalances. 
 
The devaluation of 1949, in combination with a positive demand and price development for 
Swedish export products during the Korean War, led to a surplus in the current account and a 
                                                                                                                               
Social  Democrat  party  then  governed  alone  until  1976  when  it  was  replaced  by  a  non-socialist  coalition 
government. 
 
11 Ernst Wigforss was Minister of Finance from 1932 until the summer of 1949. He was also the chairman of the 




profit boom for Swedish export industries 1950-1951.
12 Sweden also experienced a wage 
explosion and a relatively high rate of inflation. The government attempted to check inflation 
through  regulation  of  the  construction  industry,  price  controls,  stricter  rules  of  inventory 
valuation, profit freezes and by levying duties on investments and exports. In 1952-1953, the 
pace of inflation was reduced by a “mini recession” and a normalisation of export prices. But 
the subsequent recovery entailed overheating again in 1955-1956. For the first time during the 
post-war period, the Central Bank (Riksbanken) forcefully tightened monetary policy, at the 
same time as the government tried to mitigate overheating by imposing investment fees and 
by phasing out the use of free depreciation allowances for machinery and equipment. 
 
To summarize, from the end of the Second World War to the end of the 1950s Swedish fiscal 
policy was countercyclical, as was monetary policy from the mid-1950s, but with a tendency 
to  expansionism.  Governments  tried  to cushion  the  inflationary  effects  of  their  economic 
policies,  and  tendencies  to  deficits  in  the  current  account,  through  regulation,  including 
informal incomes policy, and by extraordinary fiscal measures to weaken incentives to invest, 
and to moderate price and wage increases in the most overheated industries. Indirect taxes, 
fundamental ingredients of the R-M model, were not used as a source of government incomes, 
with the exception of selective purchase taxes.  
 
4. The Golden Age of the Rehn-Meidner model 
4.1 The breakthrough 
In  the  late  1940s Rehn  and  Meidner  developed  an  alternative  to  the Keynesian  post-war 
model revealing a growing discontent with Swedish economic policy. Throughout the hot 
controversy with the Social Democratic party over its economic policy in 1949-1950, the LO 
                                         




leadership came to approve the new ideas of Rehn and Meidner. However, at the time of the 
1951 report, the LO leadership had not yet abandoned its resistance to consumer taxes. The 
hesitation of LO vis-à-vis indirect taxes throughout the 1950s contributed to delaying the 
reintroduction of general sales taxes (Erlander, 1976, pp. 265-74). Furthermore, the role of 
employment offices was actually reduced in Sweden in the early 1950s (Wadensjö, 2001, pp. 
7-8). The R-M model received its real political breakthrough during the second half of the 
1950s. In his memoirs, the Prime Minister Tage Erlander writes that he came to advocate the 
R-M labour market policy at a meeting with the LO leadership in 1955 (Erlander, 1976, pp. 
38-41).  
 
The National Labour Market Board (AMS), founded in 1948, became the chief instrument of 
the expansion of Swedish labour market policy. A large-scale active labour market policy was 
introduced for the first time during the recession of 1957-1958. Labour market policy became 
even more extensive and comprehensive in the recessions of 1966-1968 and 1970-1972. What 
is more, active labour market policy’s share of GDP and of central government expenditures 
showed a positive trend (even excluding regional policies) from the late 1950s until 1973; at 
the time of the first oil crisis, expenditure on active labour market policy measures (in relation 
to GDP) was higher in Sweden than in other OECD countries This period also saw, in line 
with the R-M model, an increasing share of Swedish expenditures on active labour market 
policies allocated to measures stimulating occupational and regional mobility and improving 
the  matching  capability  of  labour  markets.  The  share  of  demand-oriented  measures  only 
increased in the recession of the early 1970s.
13  
 
                                                                                                                               






In accordance with the R-M principle of equal pay for similar work a radical equalisation of 
wages between industries (and plants) and between men and women took place in Sweden 
from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s. Pay equalisation between industries and plants was 
more  far-reaching  in  Sweden  than  in  other  OECD  countries,  including  other  Nordic 
countries.
14  The  adjustment  of  women’s  wages  to  men’s  wages  was,  however,  as 
comprehensive in Denmark and the Netherlands as in Sweden (Ohlsson, 1980; Hibbs and 
Locking, 2000).  
 
Rehn and Meidner’s model yielded a strong economic-political rationale for putting major 
emphasis on active labour market policy and a wage policy of solidarity. There were many 
examples in the 1960s of union representatives on industry and local levels accepting the 
disappearance  of  jobs  in  stagnating  low-wage  industries  (textile  and  clothing  industry  in 
particular) referring to the need for labour mobility and structural change (Meidner, 1974, p. 
64). Moreover, it seems the social democratic government adhered to the general economic 
policy of the R-M model from the end of the 1950s until the beginning of the 1970s. Fiscal 
and monetary policy was still countercyclical - at least until the mid-1960s - but on average 
stricter than during the early post-war years.
15 Fiscal policy (for the entire public sector) was 
only mildly expansive and even restrictive (and more restrictive) during the recessions of 
1966-1968  and  1970-1972,  respectively.  The  restrained  macroeconomic  policy,  combined 
with the ambitious labour market policy, was in effect an approximative application of the R-
M model for “normal” recessions.
16 The two recessions were in fact normal in comparison to 
                                                                                                                               
13 See Appendix 1, Johannesson, 1981, figure 1, table 2 and A.1, Johannesson, 1991, table 1A and SOU 1993:43, 
diagram 5.1. 
 
14 Hibbs, 1990; Zweimuller and Barth, 1994; Hibbs and Locking, 2000. During the the previous post-war period 
wage gaps between industries had actually increased in Swedish manufacturing (see Lundh, 1992, p. 203). 
 






those of forthcoming periods.
17 In the midst of the recessions, Minister of Finance Gunnar 
Sträng pointed out that a Keynesian expansionary policy instead of a selective employment 
policy would have worsened the current account and resulted in higher inflation and thus in a 
deteriorating  competitive  position  for  Swedish  companies.
18  Sweden  also  refrained  from 
devaluation of its currency during the second half of the 1960s, contrary to the policies of 
Great Britain, Denmark and Finland. The government tackled current-account imbalances by 
selective tax allowances aimed at stimulating the expansion of the export sector.
19 
 
There are additional signs that the R-M model was applied in Sweden during the 1960s and at 
the beginning of the 1970s. Sales taxes were reintroduced in 1961 and then replaced in 1969 
by value added taxes (VAT). Public savings as a share of total savings increased markedly in 
Sweden, as compared to other OECD countries. Furthermore, in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
the gross profits share of value added in Swedish manufacturing fell considerably from the 
high levels of the 1950s (Erixon, 1987, pp. 45-51). In fact, between 1955 and 1972, Sweden 
experienced a stronger reduction in the profits share than other OECD countries (see Table 2 
in Appendix). It is true that the tendency to falling profits share and profitability in Swedish 
manufacturing was effectively counteracted by tax relieves, in particular for large, capital-
intensive enterprises. The profitability decline was reduced by almost 50 per cent considering 
the development of profit taxes. But the incidence of profit taxes was primarily favourable for 
                                                                                                                               
16 Rehn praised Gunnar Sträng for having met the tendency towards increased unemployment with an active 
labour market policy and not with an expansionary fiscal policy (Rehn, 1977, p. 223). 
 
17 In terms of GDP growth Swedish recessions in the mid-1960s and the early 1970s were also less severe than 
the recessions of the interwar period and normal or weaker than those of the previous post-war period (see 
Edvinsson, 2005, table A).   
 
18 See Ministry of Finance, Budget Bill 1971, pp. 19-20 and Revised Budget Bill 1971, p. 11, see also Swedish 
Economic Association, 1968, p. 29 and 1972, p. 8.  
 
19 Finance Minister Sträng’s well-known distrust of devaluations might have been influenced by the R-M model. 
Sträng  expected  that  a  devaluation  would  be  met  by  compensatory  claims  from  wage  earners  and  their 




Swedish companies during the second half of the 1950s, that is before or at the beginning of 
the R-M epoch.
20 
4.2. Was the Rehn-Meidner model really applied? 
The Swedish social democrats can hardly be said to have used the R-M model as a compass 
when designing macroeconomic policy from the end of the 1950s to the beginning of the 
1970s.  Fiscal  policy  (for  the  whole  public  sector)  was,  contrary  to  the  model,  mainly 
expansionary in spite of the construction of a large public supplementary pension (ATP) fund 
system from 1959.
21 According to the guidelines of the R-M model, fiscal policy became too 
expansionary  during  the  economic  booms  of  1965-1966  and  1968-1970.  Fiscal  and  also 
monetary  restraint  to  keep  inflation  down  (and  to  improve  the  current  account)  were 
introduced too late, and as a consequence, the following recessions became unnecessarily 
deep  (Matthiessen,  1971,  pp.  205-23;  Tson  Söderström,  1990,  p.  63-7).  The  large  active 
labour market policy programme was the result of a mis-timed Keynesian “stop-go” policy 
rather  than  a  strict  application  of  the  R-M  model.  Labour  market  policy  was  the  only 
alternative to keep down open unemployment, considering the delayed real effects of fiscal 
and monetary policies. The social democratic government used arguments of a R-M type to 
legitimate the economic policy ex post. 
 
The tendency to falling profit shares in manufacturing during the 1960s and the beginning of 
the 1970s was not the results of a strict application of the R-M programme.
22 The profit 
decline was considerable in Sweden, and the full employment situation probably contributed 
                                         
20 Södersten, 1971, pp. 324-5 and 329; Erixon, 1987, table 2.1. The tendency to a weaker profitability decline 
because of reductions in effective taxes also appeared in other OECD countries (Södersten and Lindberg, 1983, 
pp. 30-2; Erixon, 1987, pp. 52-3; Hoeller et al., 1996, table 9). 
 
21 In the mid-1950s, Rehn was a forceful agent in designing the social democratic proposal of a distributive 





to  the  negative  profit  trend.  But  declining  profit  shares  and  low  unemployment  were 
international phenomena at the time, that is characteristic also in countries without a sizeable 
selective employment policy. The absence of a Swedish devaluation during the 1960s - which 
could have neutralized the tendency to reduced profit margins in the exposed sector - was not 
mainly due to influences from the R-M model; Sweden simply had fewer external balance 
problems than countries that devaluated. 
 
The  LO  wage  policy  from  the  mid-1960s  was  not  only  an  application  of  the  solidarity 
principles of the LO report - equal wages for equal work - but also a general support for low 
wage groups and low wage industries. The organisation was not successful in the 1960s and 
1970s in negotiating a job evaluation system for the determination of just wage differentials.
23 
Instead a substantial part of wage equalisation during the 1960s and 1970s, both among blue-
collar and white-collar workers, followed the principle of equal wages for different jobs.
24 LO 
was of the opinion that reducing wage gaps between industries, and prioritising low wage 
groups, was in agreement with the demand of the R-M model for a more just wage structure. 
 
4.3 Favourable conditions for the Rehn-Meidner model 
The R-M model was not consistently and deliberately applied in Sweden from the end of the 
1950s up to 1973-1974. But the period must still be seen as the golden era of the model 
considering the breakthrough of active labour market policy, the wages policy of solidarity, 
indirect taxes and the tendency towards reduced profit shares and increased public savings – 
                                                                                                                               
22 According to Erik Lundberg and Assar Lindbeck the negative profit tendency during the 1960s and 1970s was 
partly a result of influence from the R-M model (Lundberg, 1985, p. 22; Lindbeck, 1997, pp. 1291-2). I have 
chosen to play down further the impact of the model on the profit decline. 
 
23 The 1951 LO report had in fact expressed scepticism against a systematic job evaluation and also argued for 
wage equalization between different occupations in the same manner as LO did in the 1960s (LO, 1953, pp. 97-
8). 
 




important intermediate goals in the R-M model. The period was also a golden era for Sweden 
in terms of the model’s objectives for macroeconomic policy. Sweden’s growth rate or trade-
off between inflation and unemployment was not exceptional in itself but it proved consistent 
with radical wage equalisation (see Erixon, 2008). 
 
The external conditions for conducting the R-M model were extremely favourable from the 
late 1950s to the early 1970s. The solidarity wages policy was facilitated by a change in the 
mid-1950s to coordinated wage bargaining in the LO area at the initiative of the employers’ 
federation (SAF). Central wage negotiations were also coordinated for the public sector from 
1966 and for private white-collar workers from 1970 (Bjørnson Barkbu, 2000). The wages 
policy of solidarity was supported in the 1960s by high labour mobility in Sweden through 
forces other than labour market policies, that is through high labour demand in urban areas, 
few double-income households, high mobility by demographic reasons (the post-war baby 
boom generation) and positive attitudes to regional mobility in general (cf. Nilsson, 1995). 
Furthermore, the wage policy of solidarity was not challenged by strong demand shocks. 
Moreover,  public  saving  increased  through  the  ATP  reform  and  profits  declined  as  a 
consequence  of  tougher  competititive  pressure  on  Swedish  companies  when  international 
trade was liberalised. Currency regulation and other restrictions on flows of financial capital 
across boarders during the Bretton Woods period made it possible to use monetary policy to 
affect  economic activity  levels and  profit  margins.  Moreover,  in the late  1960s,  Swedish 
export industries were successful and differentiated enough to prevent large current-account 
deficits and therefore a devaluation within the Bretton Woods system offsetting the tendency 
to  lower  profits  shares.  Swedish  current-account  deficits  were  also  counteracted  by 
sustainable boom conditions in other Western economies. Furthermore, the strong decline of 




expansion abroad. Foreign production by Swedish multinational corporations in relation to 
their total foreign sales decreased between 1965/1966 and 1973/1974.
25 In the 1960s and 
1970s export and foreign production were complements rather than substitutes indicating that 
nearness to markets was central to satisfying foreign demand (SOU 1982:27, Ch. 6 and 7). 
 
A long-lasting government position for the Social Democratic party was conditional for the 
implementation of the R-M model in the 1960s and early 1970s. One of the non-socialist 
parties in opposition (Centerpartiet) opposed mobility-enhancing labour market policy and all 
of them rejected public saving in the supplementary pension fund system and first also the 
introduction of consumption taxes. The appointment of Gunnar Sträng as Minister of Finance 
in the mid-1950s facilitated the introduction of the R-M model.
 Together with Bertil Olsson, 
new head of the AMS in 1957, Gunnar Sträng was the chief architect of the expansion of 
labour market policy. In the late 1950s, Sträng became a supporter of sales taxes (Erlander, 




The application of the R-M model was also facilitated by the strong Swedish support for state 
interventionism  to  stabilise  GDP  and  employment;  a  guiding  principle  also  for  leading 
economists at that time (cf. Lindbeck, 1997, pp. 1274-6). The strength of state interventionism 
in Sweden goes at least back to the 1930s (especially the early breakthrough of Keynesian 
ideas).  It  is  incorrect  to  say,  however,  that  the  R-M  model  was  endorsed  by  Swedish 
                                         
25 The conclusion is drawn for a large group of multinational companies (Swedenborg et al. 1988, table 2.5; 
Swedenborg, 2001, fig. 4.1), for 12 large multinational companies in manufacturing (Erixon, 1988, pp. 79-81) 
and also for 9 large multinational companies in engineering (Erixon, 1997, p. 68 and table 11). 
 
26 Lundberg, 1981, pp. 99-101. Per Edvin Sköld, Minister of Finance 1949-1955, was decidedly hostile toward 
the LO report. He warned against a reduction of company profits and a weakening of the economic responsibility 
of the trade union movement that would threaten the full employment policy and make a compulsory incomes 
policy necessary. During his term as Minister of Finance Sköld also opposed indirect taxation.  In 1955, when 




economists. In the late 1940s Erik Lundberg, a leading Stockholm school economist, and 
Bertil  Ohlin,  who  was  now  the  chairman  of  the  largest  non-socialist  party  (Folkpartiet), 
wanted to conquer the stabilisation-policy failures of the Keynesian post-war model with a 
redefinition of full employment. Although receptive to the idea of active labour market policy, 
Lundberg  and  Ohlin  came  to  advocate  a  general  economic  policy  restrictive  enough  to 
stabilize nominal  wages by  giving up  the high ambition of unemployment rates below 3 
percent.
27  Lundberg’s  attitude  to  the  R-M  model  was  sympathetic  but  critical.  His  main 
criticism was political and ideological – major public savings and selective economic policy 
programmes would cause the emergence of a bureaucratic control apparatus that in the long 
term presented a threat to democracy. In economic terms Lundberg’s main objection to the 
model was that it underestimated the importance of high profits, both ex ante and ex post, for 
private investment. Admitting the risk of financial “locking-in” effects from self-financing, 




The breakthrough of Rehn and Meidner’s ideas in Sweden in the 1960s and early 1970s 
cannot be explained by the support of other economists but rather by the strong position of 
LO,  and  its  economists,  in  the  discourse  of  economic  policy-making.  The  rate  of 
unemployment was permanently low and the LO organised 77 per cent of blue-collar workers 
in  1960;  this  share  rose  to  86  per  cent  in  1974.
29  Through  its  close  ties  to  the  social 
                                         
27 Lundberg and Ohlin also referred, as did in fact Rehn and Meidner at the time, to shrinking productivity in an 
overheated economy (Ohlin, 1949, 10-26; Lundberg, 1952a, p. 9 and 1952b, pp. 70-1).   
 
28 See Lundberg, 1952b, p. 67, 1972, pp. 480-5 and 1985, p. 19. Rehn and Meidner emphasised that profit 
margins must be reduced in the medium term but not in the long run and not to depression levels. They also 
stressed the importance of large profit differentials rather than of high profit levels in general. Labour market 
policies, marginal employment subsidies and solidaristic wages policy were means to promote structural change 
by widening profit gaps between dynamic and stagnating firms, see LO, 1953, pp. 90-4, Meidner, 1969, p. 193, 





democratic government and (early) participation in coordinated wage bargaining, LO had a 
strong impact on the scope and character of economic policy (Öhman, 1974). LO also saw, at 
least until the mid-1960s, solidarity wage policy and labour market policy as instruments to 
attain labour mobility and structural change.
30 The power position and priorities of the LO 




5. The Rehn-Meidner model during the turbulent 1970s and 1980s 
5.1 External challenges 
In the 1970s, Sweden was hit, as were other small Western European countries, by the two oil 
crises (OPEC I and II), subsequent forceful demand shocks and by the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system (1973) leading to uncertain currency conditions. A restrictive monetary policy 
to reduce inflationary pressure after the two oil shocks, mainly in West Germany and the 
United States (at the start of the 1980s), led to a major crisis for Swedish export industries. In 
addition, Swedish companies met with increased competition from Japan and new industrial 
countries  operating  in  the  world  market  for  ships,  iron  ore  and  steel  products.  Also,  the 
specialisation of exports in raw materials, semi-finished goods and investment goods was 
unfavourable to Swedish manufacturing during a period with deep international recessions. 
Between  1973  and  1982  export  growth  was  lower  for  Sweden  than  for  all  other  OECD 
                                                                                                                               
29 Kjellberg, 1983, p. 278; D’Agostino, 1987, p. 18. In an international perspective union density rates were high 
in Sweden for both blue-collar and white-collar workers in the 1960s and 1970s (Visser, 1992). 
 
30 The LO Congress of 1951 had sanctioned, although without any formal decision, the R-M guidelines for a new 
economic policy. The president of the Metal Workers’ Union, Arne Geijer, had opposed the solidarity wage 
policy of the R-M model at the congress. But once Geijer became president of the LO in 1956 he came to 
personify support for the solidarity wages policy and also for the mobility-enhancing labour market policy. In the 
report  of  the  LO  economists  to  the  1961  LO  Congress,  “Coordinated  Industrial  Policy”  (Samordnad 
näringspolitik), the focus was on structural change and economic growth, not on stabilisation policy as in the 
1951 report. 
 
31 SAF was unable or unwilling to formulate any criticism of or alternative to the R-M model in the early post-




countries and value added growth in manufacturing only higher for Sweden than for Great 
Britain (OECD, Historical Statistics 1988, table 3.5 and 11.2). However, during the 1980s, 
Sweden would, like other Western European countries, benefit from a long-term boom in the 
United States.  
 
5.2 The Rehn-Meidner heritage 
The so-called bridging policies of 1974-1976 in Sweden were a social democratic effort to 
stimulate  domestic  demand  during  an  international  recession.  It  consisted  mainly  of  a 
reduction  of  VAT  in  1974,  support  for  inventory  investment  and  of  changes  to  the  tax 
structure  (see  the  Haga  agreements  in  Section  5.3).  A  centre-right,  three-party,  coalition 
government formed in 1976 continued on the Keynesian road of devaluations, instead of 
introducing a policy of fiscal and monetary restraint, when the Swedish deficit in the current 
account increased after OPEC I.
32 The new government devalued the krona once in 1976 and 
twice (by almost 16 per cent in relation to the currencies of competing countries) in 1977. 
 
There is no reason to place too much stress on the deviation of the bridging and devaluation 
policies  from  the  R-M  model.  These  policies  were  adopted  in  a  situation  of  exceptional 
recession tendencies and current-account deficits. Swedish fiscal policy (from both the central 
government  and  the  entire  public  sector)  was  in  fact  neutral  or  restrictive,  and  even 
procyclical, during the bridging policy years of 1975 and 1976. However, fiscal policy turned 
less  restrictive  and  directly  expansionary  in  1977,  that  is  at  the  trough  of  the  Swedish 
                                                                                                                               
inflationary  wage  races  in  an  overheated  economy.  In  the  inter-war  period  SAF  had  in  fact  supported  the 
principle of equal pay for similar jobs before LO (Faxén, 1989). 
 
32  The  government  in  1976  was  formed  by  Centerpartiet,  Folkpartiet  and  Moderata  Samlingspartiet 
(Conservative Party). Folkpartiet formed a minority government 1978-1979. After the elections in the Autumn 
of 1979, the former centre-right three-party government was reestablished. In 1981 Moderata Samlingspartiet 
left the government. After the election in the Autumn of 1982, the social democrats recaptured all seats in the 
Cabinet. But they could only form a majority in Parliament through the support from Vänsterpartiet (the former 





33 Irrespective of political colour, Swedish governments also carried on ambitious 
selective employment programmes during the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s. 
Centre-right governments from 1976 embarked on selective employment policy (or rather 
industrial policy) by subsidizing large enterprises in mining, iron and steel and shipbuilding 
industries  to  prevent  plant  closures  and  mass  lay-offs.  (A  centre-right  government  also 
initiated a nationalisation and reconstruction of the steel industry.) The enterprises receiving 
extraordinary government subsidies  had been hit by  a worldwide recession and increased 
competition from Japan and the NIC countries. Similar subsidies were paid in other countries, 
but they were more extensive in Sweden than in, for example, Finland and Norway (Carlsson, 
1983). Between 1975 and 1983, industry subsidies amounted to 29 percent of all Swedish 
expenditures on selective employment policy including regional policy.
34  
 
Active labour market  policy expanded during the recessions in the mid-1970s and at the 
beginning of the 1980s in relation to both GDP and total central government expenditures. 
The share of the labour force in labour market policy programmes in 1984 - 5 per cent – was a 
Swedish record not broken until the middle of the 1990s.
35 The increased expenditure on 
active labour market policy in the mid-1970s was first concentrated on measures to maintain 
labour  demand  from  enterprises  in  order to  avoid  dismissals,  mainly  support  to  build  up 
inventory  and  subsidies  to  in-plant  training.  The  proportion  of  another  demand-oriented 
measure – relief work programmes (especially for youth) - increased the most, both absolutely 
and relatively, when unemployment rose in 1977 and in 1982-1983. But despite extensive 
                                         
33 See Price and Muller, 1984, table 1, Erixon, 1985, p. 18, Calmfors, 1993, figure 11, OECD Economic Outlook, 
December 1994, 1995 and 1998, Table 30 and 31, Frank, Ohlsson and Vredin, 1993, Figure 4, 5 and 6 and 
Braconier and Holden, 1999, Fig. 5.2.5. In 1974-1976, that is in the era of the Keynesian bridging policies, 
inflation was actually lower in Sweden than in weighted OECD and EU countries and even lower than in other 
small Western European countries. 
 
34 Johannesson, 1991, table 1A and 1995, table 2.1. 
 




demand-oriented  programmes  (excluding  employment  subsidies  throughout  this  paper), 
mobility and adjustment measures did actually increase their share of total expenditure on 
active  labour  market  policy  in  the  second  half  of  the  1970s,  see  Table  1  in  Appendix.
36 
Moreover,  the  fact  that  labour  market  policy  became  more  demand-oriented  during  the 
recessions of the mid-1970s and early 1980s was no serious violation of the principle of the 
R-M model; the possibilities of avoiding a major increase in open unemployment through 
other labour market policy measures were limited.  
 
5.3 Departures from the Rehn-Meidner model 
Despite all, selective employment policy during the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s 
might  have  been  too  defensive  to  meet  the  R-M  model’s  aims  of  labour  mobility  and 
structural change. This conclusion is valid for the job-protecting measures of labour market 
policy in the mid-1970s. The subsidies to “crisis industries” were definitely too large and 
lasted  for  too  long  from  the  perspective  of  the  R-M  model.  However,  the  design  of 
macroeconomic policy, particularly the expansionary fiscal and exchange-rate policy during 
recoveries, was the major challenge to the model from the mid-1970s. A departure from the 
R-M  macroeconomic  policy  occurred  already  in  1973-1974  when  Sweden  experienced  a 
positive  demand  shock  without  correspondence  in  other  OECD  countries.  (Finland  is  a 
possible exception.) Rising international raw material prices and increased foreign demand for 
investment goods led to a profit boom in Swedish export industries in 1973-1974. The social 
democratic government did not exploit the opportunity in connection with the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system to alleviate the profit boom through a revaluation. In the mid-
1970s  the  situation  with  “excess  profits”  turned  into  a  cost  and  profitability  crisis.  The 
reaction of nominal wages to the asymmetric demand shock of 1973-1974 largely explains, 
                                         




together with low open unemployment, why the cost crisis and decline in profit shares during 
the following international recession became more spectacular in Sweden than in other OECD 
countries.  The  wage  cost  crisis  (reinforced  by  a  tardy  revaluation)  weakened  Swedish 
competitiveness  in  terms  of  (relative)  unit  labour  costs,  which  in  turn  contributed  to  the 
country’s loss of market share during the second half of the 1970s.  
 
Erik  Lundberg  described  the  wage  explosion,  the  dramatic  profitability  decline  and  the 
extensive selective employment programmes in Sweden in the mid-1970s as a parody of the 
R-M model (Lundberg, 1985, p. 26). In fact, contemporary bridging policy was a Keynesian 
reaction to the R-M macroeconomic policy in the recession of the early 1970s. Swedish policy 
makers  also  met  the  tendencies  to  stagflation  in  the  mid-1970s  by  incomes  policy.  The 
expectations behind the “Haga agreements” between the political parties and central labour 
market  organisations  in  1974-1975  were  that  the  combination  of  increased  payroll  taxes 
(aggravating the profit crisis in the short run) and reduced income taxes for wage earners 
would lead to lower central wage claims. The failure of the Haga agreements to prevent a cost 
and profitability crisis reflected, from the R-M point of view, a too passive macroeconomic 
policy in the recovery 1972-1974.  
 
The looser fiscal policy from general government (and the lack of strong counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy from central government) in the recovery of 1978-1980 was another break with 
the R-M model leading to a structural public budget deficit and a new deficit in the current 
account even before OPEC II. Fiscal policy was eased in spite of low real rates of interest 
during the 1974-1980 period of high inflation. (Like those of many other OECD countries, 
Swedish real long-term rates of interest were even negative during some years.) In addition, 
                                                                                                                               




the  non-socialist  government  had  no  intention  to  make  a  priority  of  public  saving  but 
introduced a tax-subventioned individual saving system in 1978; in fact, back in power, the 
social democratic government launched a similar “Everyman’s saving system” in 1984.  
 
Fiscal policy for general government was tightened during the recession of the early 1980s.
37 
The stricter fiscal policy might have been acceptable from the R-M perspective, in particular 
as the policy was combined with extensive selective employment policy measures. However, 
it is dubitable whether fiscal restraint in the early 1980s really was in line with the R-M model 
during a recession shaped by OPEC II and increasing real interest rates. The rate of open 
unemployment in Sweden rose to 3.5 per cent in 1983, the highest rate so far in the post-war 
period (OECD Economic Outlook, 2000, table 21 and 22). Fiscal austerity in the early 1980s 
was  an  obvious  violation  of  a  Keynesian  bridging  policy  for  a  recession.  But  Sweden’s 
departure from a Keynesian economic policy was not complete. In the fall of 1981, during a 
substantial capital outflow from Sweden due to a deteriorated balance of payments situation, 
the non-socialist government devalued the krona instead of allowing the Central Bank to 
increase the prime interest rate. Soon after regaining government power in the fall of 1982, 
the social democrats again devalued the krona. The devaluations of the early 1980s reduced 
the value of the krona by 26 per cent - 10 and 16 percent respectively - in relation to a basket 
of other currencies.  
 
The  strong  devaluation  by  the  social  democrats  in  1982  was  offensive  in  the  sense  that 
Sweden’s competitiveness had already been restored through the non-socialist devaluation the 
year  before.  Previous  capital  outflows  would  have  needed  a  small  social  democratic 




Feldts’s “third way” to improve Sweden’s current account and simultaneously increase total 
employment. The devaluation was combined with appeals to the social partners for wage 
moderation. High profits in the exposed sector were important means along the third way to 
bolster private investment and transfer resources to the exposed sector. Feldt’s third way was 
a clear departure from the R-M model. The devaluations of the early 1980s led, along with a 
strong dollar and an international recovery, to a profit boom in Swedish export industries. 
Moreover, the government did not revalue the krona in the mid-1980s, in spite of obvious 
signs of an overheated labour market and favourable external conditions in the form of a 
current-account surplus. The recovery of Swedish profit shares from the mid-1970s to the late 
1980s was among the strongest in the OECD area (see Table 2 in Appendix). 
 
Swedish fiscal policy was predominantly countercyclical during the boom of the 1980s - the 
structural public budget deficit was eliminated 1987 - but not enough to counteract the strong 
tendency to overheating.
38 The social democratic government tried to check inflation through 
price controls, and by appealing for wage restraint. In the middle of the decade, the parties on 
the labour market agreed to set a ceiling for wage increases through the so-called “Rosenbad 
rounds”. (Rosenbad is the name of the government office.) However, the pace of the wage 
increases was to break through the ceiling. When the boom reached its peak in 1990, the LO 
leadership (and the Metal Workers’ Union) also accepted a price, wage and strike stop. But 
the  “stop  package”  did  not  get  majority  support  in  Parliament,  which  in  turn  led  to  a 
government crisis and the resignation of the Minister of Finance, Kjell-Olof Feldt. 
                                                                                                                               
37 Fiscal policy for central government was clearly expansive first in 1982. See Price and Muller, 1984, table 1, 
Calmfors, 1993, Figure 11, OECD Economic Outlook, December 1994, 1995 and 1998, Table 30 and 31, Frank, 
Ohlsson and Vredin, 1993, Figure 5-6 and Braconier and Holden, 1999, fig. 5.2.5 and 5.3.4. 
 
38 With some annual exceptions fiscal policy was tightened during the boom of the 1980s, both for the central 
government (see Calmfors, 1993, figure 11 and Frank, Ohlsson and Vredin, 1993, figure 4, 5 and 6) and for the 
consolidated public sector (OECD Economic Outlook June 1996, 1998 and 2000, table 31 and June 2005, table 





Swedish stabilisation policy deviated from the R-M  model during  the  second half of the 
1980s. It was based on an incorrect combination of measures, if the model is to be interpreted 
strictly. The social democratic government fought inflation by incomes policy deals instead of 
through the introduction of restrictive fiscal measures and hard currency policies. Continued 
low unemployment was elicited by high aggregate demand, not through substantial selective 
employment programmes. The R-M model was followed during the second half of the 1980s 
in the sense that training replaced demand-oriented programmes as the most important labour 
market  policy  measure.
39  In  fact,  from  1985  until  2005,  supply  and  matching  oriented 
measures  were  the  most  important  components  of  Swedish  labour  market  policy  (see 
Appendix 1). Furthermore, a fall in the active labour market policy share of GDP (and the 
share of the labour force participating in AMS measures) from the mid-1980s largely reflected 
improved labour-market conditions. But the dismantling of labour market policy in the second 
half  of  the  decade  was  probably  too  drastic  to  satisfy  the  R-M  model’s  stipulation  of 
preventing labour bottle-necks in a severely overheated economy.     
 
There were other departures from the R-M model in the 1980s. A radical wage equalisation 
had  occurred  during  the  first  half  of  the  1970s,  but  from  the  middle  of  the  1980s  wage 
differences were allowed to increase substantially in the LO/SAF area.
40 Wage gaps widened, 
not only between wage earners with different qualifications and jobs inside industries (and 
plants), but also between wage earners with equal jobs in different industries (and plants) – an 
obvious violation of the solidarity policy of the 1951 LO report.  
 
                                         
39  This  reorientation  of  labour-market  policy  was  obvious  in  terms  of  expenditures  and  also  in  terms  of 
programme participants if measures for disabled persons are ignored (Appendix 1; Johannesson, 1995, table 2.1 
and 2.2; Calmfors, 1993, pp. 28-9; Johannesson, 1991, table 1 A and 1995, table 2.1 and 2.2; Ackum Agell, 




Why did Sweden depart from the Rehn-Meidner model? 
Both social democratic and centre-right governments pursued an active labour market policy 
to prevent open mass unemployment during the recessions of the mid-1970s and the early 
1980s. However, subsidies to industries in crisis, and possibly also some labour-market policy 
measures, broke with the principle of structural change in the R-M model. Moreover, tighter 
fiscal  policy  after  OPEC  II  than  after  OPEC  I  was  a  possible  challenge  to  the  strong 
prioritisation of full employment in the model. But more obvious, Swedish macroeconomic 
policy was, according to the yardstick of the R-M model, on average too expansionary in the 
1970s and 1980s, contributing to negative financial saving for the public sector from the late 
1970s. Finally, widening wage gaps between workers with similar jobs from the mid-1980s 
was a break with the R-M model. 
 
Strong external shocks (including fiercer competition from Japan and NIC-countries) made it 
more difficult to apply the economic-policy programme of the R-M model through the 1970s 
and 1980s. The possibility of stagflation because of supply shocks (see OPEC I and II) was 
not accounted for in the model. Moreover, deep international recessions gave labour market 
policy a more prominent role, and also a more demand-oriented profile, in the mid-1970s and 
early  1980s  than  in  the  original  model  designed  for  an  economy  with  “islands  of 
unemployment” (Rehn, 1952a, p. 34). However, external shocks cannot in themselves explain 
departures from the R-M model in Sweden during the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
In the mid-1960s, LO began to prioritise job security, work environment, worker participation 
and  collective  ownership  rather  than  labour  mobility  and  structural  change.  During  the 
following  decade  LO  induced  the  social  democratic  government  to  legislate  on  co-
                                                                                                                               




determination, work environment and also on job protection, the Job Security Act of 1974. 
Job protection measures in labour market policy and subsidies to companies in stagnating 
industries during the second half of the 1970s displayed the ideological hegemony of LO. But 
they also reflected the shift of priorities within the organisation, and the Swedish society at 
large, violating the goal of structural change and perhaps also the principle of employment 
security – in contrast to job security - in the R-M model. 
 
A  disappointment  cycle  provides  a  plausible  explanation  of  changes  in  Swedish 
macroeconomic policy in the 1970s and 1980s. The adoption of new means in economic 
policy was based on discouraging experiences of economic policy in the past. In the mid-
1970s, the general attitude of politicians and economists was that domestic demand had been 
too low during the previous recession. The bridging policies, recommended by the OECD, 
were largely a Keynesian reaction to the R-M policy during the recession at the beginning of 
the decade. (However a similar bridging policy was conceived in Denmark and Norway.) A 
new consensus was then established around 1980s maintaining that the overbridging policy 
made a significant contribution to Swedish inflation and marked the beginning of a period 
with  current-account  and  public-budget  deficits.  The  structural  public  deficit  -  a  new 
phenomenon in Swedish economic history - largely explains why a bridging policy was not 
pursued in Sweden after OPEC II as after OPEC I. 
 
However the switch of economic policy in the early 1980s cannot be understood without 
references to new economic thinking. Non-socialist economic advisors were governed by the 
rebirth of “pre-Keynesian” ideas of crowding-out as an effect of a large public budget-deficit 
and public sector. They were also influenced by supply-side economics giving priority to 




demand management. The main document of this new economic thinking was the Medium 
Term Survey presented in 1980. Also social democratic experts began to use crowding-out 
and  supply-side  arguments  in  the  early  1980s  further  reducing  the  support  for  domestic-
demand stimuli to achieve full employment (Bergström, 1987, pp. 94-7 and 103-4). Among 
other things they recommended restrictive fiscal policies along the third way to reduce the 
public budget deficit. The Ministry of Finance also emphasised, as did influential academic 
economists at  that  time,  the  necessity  of  reducing  inflation expectations, thus  initiating  a 
critique of Swedish “accommodation policies” (Ministry of Finance, Revised Budget Bill, 
1983,  appendix  1,  pp.  1-14).  The  critique  was  first  directed  against  domestic  demand 
management but soon also against new devaluations. Immediately after the devaluation in 
1982, Finance Minister Feldt and other representatives of the social democratic government 
found it urgent to inform the parties on the labour market that compensatory nominal wage 
increases would not be corrected by expansionary fiscal measures or by new devaluations 
(Lindvall,  2004,  p.  126).  New  economic  thinking  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  affected  the 
interpretation  of  past  developments  and  assessment  of  earlier  economic  policy  actions. 
However, the evaluation of older economic policy strategies was not always based on an 
undisputable  analysis  of  underlying  causal  mechanisms.  For  example,  the  magnitude  and 
negative effects of the Keynesian bridging policy in the mid-1970s were largely exaggerated 
(see above). 
 
Economic-policy experiences and arguments about public crowding out in the early 1980s 
primarily hit the Keynesian post-war model, not the R-M model recommending a restrictive 
macroeconomic  policy  in  the  medium  term.  In  fact,  economists associated  with  the  non-
socialist  government  began  reviewing  the  R-M  economic  policy  during  the  early  1970s 




economics were either compatible with the market-conforming R-M model or critical to other 
features of the “Swedish model”, for example wage compression in general and progressive 
taxes.
41 The Swedish disappointment cycle provided, however, a serious challenge to the R-M 
model in the early 1980s. In the mid-1970s indications of a decline in the long-run profits 
share and profitability in the business sector were seen by Erik Lundberg, but also by other 
leading  Swedish  economists,  as  the  main  source  of  falling  investment  ratios  in  Sweden 
(Lindbeck, 1975, pp. 234-9 and 1976, p. 124). In the early 1980s, Swedish politicians and 
their experts were stunned by the deep cost and profitability crisis in the middle of the 1970s 
which they blamed for the subsequent decline in private investment and losses of Swedish 
markets shares. This hypothesis was not anchored in macroeconomics to the same extent as 
that about the shortcomings of Keynesianism. In fact, actual profits, relative prices and unit 
(labour)  costs  had  a  peripheral,  ad-hoc,  position  in  contemporary  macroeconomics. 
Furthermore, the unique character of the Swedish cost and profitability crises and the negative 
effects of higher unit labour costs on Swedish market shares were probably overstated in the 
Swedish economic-policy debate (Erixon, 1985, pp. 14 and 27-30 and 1989, pp. 183-92). 
Nevertheless,  a  new  consensus  developed  among  Swedish  politicians  and  their  economic 
advisors insisting that low inflation was a necessary condition for full employment and that 
wage  earners  and  companies,  by  low  wage  claims  and  relative  prices,  should  take 
responsibility  for  employment  in  the  short  run.
42  Moreover  information  about  Sweden’s 
(relative) wage and profit development and a “conventional wisdom” among economists and 
politicians about the origin of the country’s industrial stagnation largely explain, together with 
a  structural  fiscal  deficit,  a  current-account  deficit  and  the  continuing  priority  of  full 
employment, why the social democrats opted for a strong devaluation in 1982.  
                                         
41 In 1981 Swedish marginal taxes were modestly reduced through an agreement between two parties in the non-
socialist government (Folkpartiet and Centerpartiet) and the social democrats (the “Wonderful Night”). 
 





Swedish deviations from the R-M model, and also from Keynesianism, in the early 1980s 
were  facilitated  by  the  replacement  of  Gunnar  Sträng  by  Kjell-Olof  Feldt  as  the  main 
spokesman of social democratic economic policy.
43 Furthermore, these deviations are partly 
explained by a shift in power relations. In the 1970s and 1980s the Ministry of Finance had 
gradually  increased  its  influence  over  Swedish  economic  policy  at  the  expense  of  other 
ministries,  political  parties,  Parliament  and  labour  market  organisations.  Before  the  1982 
election, the  Social Democratic party in opposition  had advocated extensive public infra-
structural investments and housing programmes to reduce unemployment. In power, the party 
was persuaded by its economic advisors, recruited from and now employed again by the 
Ministry of Finance, to abandon this Keynesian policy.
44 However a stronger position for 
experts  in  the  Ministry  of  Finance  cannot  explain  the  social  democratic  economic  policy 
without reference to the growing doubts about Keynesianism among economists. The third 
way reflected a lingering influence from the Keynesian post-war model - devaluation and 
incomes policy - but also a challenge to domestic-demand management in economics.  
 
Furthermore, the political and ideological influence of LO gradually deteriorated in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The defeat of the social democrats in the 1976 was only a temporary draw-back 
for LO. More decisive was the LO proposal of wage earner funds the same year, built on a 
report by Meidner to the LO Congress 1976 advocating collective profit sharing. The aim of 
wage earner funds was to change wealth distribution and power relations in favour of labour 
and also to appropriate excess profits as a result of the wages policy of solidarity – the most 
profitable firms could have paid higher wages than the solidaristic wages. Wage earner funds 
were supported, albeit more and more reluctantly, by the social democrat leadership. The 
                                         




funds became a political burden for the party in the 1976 election and also, notwithstanding a 
modification of the original LO proposal, in the 1979 election. A decision in Parliament in 
1983 to introduce a watered-downed system of wage-earner funds developed by the social 
democratic  government  marks  the  end  of  a  period  in  which  the  LO  had  maintained  an 
exceptional position as an initiator of Swedish economic policy. (The funds were abolished by 
a non-socialist government in 1994.) LO on the defensive sanctioned the social democratic 
devaluation in 1982 arguing for higher profits to overcome the industrial crisis (Bergström, 
1987, pp. 99-101). In the middle of the 1980s LO economists recommended a revaluation of 
the krona (LO, 1984, 26-7 and 137-8). However they then supported the Keynesian post-war 
strategy by ardently opposing the government’s ambition to restrict domestic demand, arguing 
for  selective  fiscal  measures  to  cool  overheated  sectors,  and  by  accepting  continual 
devaluations or flexible exchange rates as the last resort to sustain full employment. LO’s 
growing resistance to fiscal austerity, but also to wage moderation (when stock markets were 
booming), deregulation of credit markets, proposals of limited increases in unemployment 
benefits only and marginal tax reductions (proposed and actual), triggered a “war of roses” 
between LO and the social democrat government in the middle of the 1980s. By referring to 
globalisation, LO economists also began to openly criticize the R-M profit squeezing policy 
for being out of date (LO-tidningen, 1989). 
 
The unique position of LO in economic-policy and wage formation was weakened in the 
1970s  by  the  growth  of  white-collar  worker  organisations.  The  LO  share  of  total  union 
members in Sweden was 74 per cent in 1960. This share then decreased steadily, to 63 per 
cent in 1975 and to 58 per cent in 1990 (Kjellberg, 2000, table 16.1). White-collar worker 
organisations had no direct ties to any political party and there was no pressure on them to 
                                                                                                                               




practice or envisage a unique “Swedish model” of economic policy. SAF’s position had also 
been  strengthened  at  the  expense  of  LO’s,  for  example  through  an  ideological  offensive 
starting in the late 1970s. SAF was successful in raising public resistance to wage earner 
funds and also in using the fund issue to unify fractions within the private business sector 
supporting either coordinated or industrial wage negotiations (Viktorov, 2006, ch. 6).  
 
A reasonable argument is that labour strength and also the R-M model’s value as a guide for 
economic-policy  making  was  reduced  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  through  globalisation. 
Countries following the profits-squeezing recommendations of the R-M model might have 
risked capital flight and relocation of production to other countries. Globalisation of financial 
markets and enterprises had indubitably reduced the efficiency of national economic policy 
aimed at reducing industrial profit margins. During the second half of the 1970s and the 
1980s, foreign production by Swedish multinational companies increased as a ratio of their 
total sale and also of their total foreign sales.
45 Foreign investment by Swedish multinationals 
might have produced a rival relation between foreign and domestic units, for instance where 
sales  to  third  countries  are  concerned,  making  Swedish  production  and  employment 
increasingly  vulnerable  to  unit  cost  and  profit  differentials  (cf.  Erixon,  1997,  pp.  77-8). 
However, larger foreign production by Swedish multinationals as a consequence of higher 
unit labour costs in Sweden was no major explanation of the country’s loss of market share 
during the second half of the 1970s. Moreover, there was no increase in third-country sales for 
an aggregate of Swedish multinational companies from 1974 to 1978 (SOU 1982: 27, pp. 
240-52). Neither is there any evidence for the 1965-1994 period that foreign production by 
Swedish multinational companies had curtailed exports from Sweden (Swedenborg, 2001).
46  
                                         
45 See Erixon, 1988, p. 81, Swedenborg et al., 1988, table 2.5, Ekholm and Hesselman, 2000, table 6 and figure 4 






Swedish departures from the R-M model in the 1970s and 1980s are perhaps better explained 
by political-institutional than by economic-structural changes. The change to a non-socialist 
government  in  the  mid-1970s  marked  the  beginning  of  a  period  until  the  late  1990s  of 
government  subsidies  to  public  saving.  Furthermore  Swedish  deviations  from  the 
macroeconomic policy of the R-M model are explained by a shift of exchange-rate regime. 
Sweden had first participated in the European currency cooperation after the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, and then (in 1977) built its own system of fixed exchange rates. The 
value of the krona was decided in relation to a basket of currencies, in which every currency 
reflected  the  importance  of  the  country  as  a  competitor  to  Sweden.  The  new  Swedish 
exchange-rate system increased opportunities to stimulate the economy by devaluations. This 
system is also one explanation of why overheating of the Swedish economy took on new 
proportions during the second half of the 1980s. The fact that the dollar was assigned more 
weight  in  Sweden’s  currency  basket  than  the  US  share  of  Swedish  trade  contributed  to 
overheating.  The  competitiveness  and  profits  of  Swedish  manufacturing  were  maintained 
during  the  second  half  of  the  1980s  by  the  krona  losing  its  value  concurrently  with  the 
weakening of the dollar. 
 
Another political-institutional change – a deregulation of the credit market – was a major 
factor behind Swedish overheating in the second half of the 1980s. An instant dismantling of 
monetary-policy instruments in the mid-1980s led, under the existing tax system, to a credit-
financed  consumption,  construction  and  stock-market  boom.  Credit  deregulation  was  not 
                                                                                                                               
46 Furthermore, a criticism that globalisation of companies and finance markets makes the R-M model out of 
date must be qualified, as the model recommends supply and adjustment oriented measures on product and 
labour markets, together with restrictive general economic policies, to fight inflation. Marginal employment 
subsidies, for instance, could persuade global enterprises to invest in a given country in spite of falling profit 
margins on average. Moreover, the consumption taxes of the R-M model are not as vulnerable to global tax 




preceeded  or  immediately  followed  by  the  abolition  of  a  distorted  tax  system  favouring 
borrowing  during  inflation.  Furthermore  deregulation  was  facilitated  by  the  fact  that 
economic  experts  from  the  Ministry  of  Finance  were  represented  in  the  Central  Bank’s 
governing board at the time (Lindvall, 2004, p. 78). The possibilities of using monetary policy 
measures to affect the real economy were also limited due to the exchange-rate system policy 
of maintaining the value of the krona on an ever more globalised currency market. Moreover, 
a dismantling of Swedish capital controls had begun in the 1970s. And the efficiency of 
rationing instruments in Swedish monetary policy had been reduced in the 1970s and 1980s 
by the establishment of new financial institutions not embraced by credit controls. At the 
same time, lingering currency restrictions, not abandoned until 1989, accentuated overheating 
tendencies in Sweden by restricting investment abroad. 
 
The dismantling of monetary policy in the mid-1980s, reducing the range of stabilisation 
policy  measures  was,  however,  no  decisive  challenge  to  the  R-M  model  (or  even  to  the 
Keynesian post-war model of stabilisation) in an economy with fixed exchange-rates. Why 
Swedish fiscal policy and exchange-rate policy was not restrictive enough during overheated 
conditions in the second half of the 1980s still needs to be explained. The passive fiscal and 
exchange-rate policy policy largely reflected economic-policy failures and political business-
cycle behaviour. Contractionary measures were postponed by statistical lags but also by the 
psychology of politics – leading social democrats were blinded by the fact that the third way, 
as late as 1989, was celebrated as a success, both in Sweden and internationally (OECD, 
1987; Feldt, 1991, pp. 279-80, 317, 358 and 370). Moreover, fiscal restraint was avoided by 
the social democrats before the 1988 election. (Analogously, a non-socialist government had 
pursued an expansionary fiscal policy before the 1979 election.) The passive stabilisation 




eventual sharing of the growing scepticism in macroeconomics about fine tuning, an essential 
part of the challenge to Keynesianism in economics since the 1970s (Feldt, 1991, pp. 252-53).    
 
Wider wage  gaps in  Sweden from  the  mid-1980s also  largely  followed a departure  from 
coordinated central wage negotiations for both white-collar and blue-collar workers. Central 
wage agreements have been industry-specific since 1983 even though LO often succeeded to 
coordinate  wage  demands  of  blue-collar  trade  unions  and  negotiations  were  occasionally 
coordinated during the second half of the 1980s (see also the Rehnberg commission in next 
section). The departure from central wage coordination was initiated by SAF but supported by 
the Metal Workers’ Union. The devaluations contributed to the decision of the union in 1983 
to  withdraw  from  coordinated  LO-SAF  negotiations.  The  union,  organising  the  best-paid 
blue-collar  workers  in  manufacturing,  regarded  wage  coordination  as  a  straitjacket  in  a 
situation of great opportunities for wage increases. Its members had been disfavoured by 
wage  compression  within  blue-collar  and  white-collar  worker  groups  respectively.  In  the 
1970s and early 1980s, wage differences between low-paid white-collar workers and high-
paid blue-collar workers in the private sector were relatively stable (Hibbs, 1990, pp. 186-8). 
Thus the decision of the Metal Workers’ union to abandon central wage coordination in the 
mid-1980s largely reflected the practice of the wage policy of solidarity - a policy of general 
wage compression had not embraced both blue-collar and white-collar organisations. 
 
The decision by SAF to abandon central wage coordination was initiated by the engineering 
industries, particularly the automobile industry, despite the fact that these industries had been 
favoured by the policy of equal wage for similar jobs. Some social researchers saw the new 
wage policy of SAF as evidence that decentralised bargaining was more rational under the 




(Swenson  and  Pontusson,  2000).  However,  standardised  production  processes  were  still 
important in Swedish manufacturing, not least through continued globalisation enlarging the 
companies’ foreign markets. Moreover, from the late 1970s, there was no uniform tendency 
towards decentralised bargaining in OECD countries. Neither was there any general tendency 
in the 1990s and 2000s towards more decentralisation within countries (such as Sweden) 
specialising in ICT products.
47 The growing resistance to coordinated wage bargaining and 
wage policy of solidarity among large engineering companies in the 1970s and 1980s might 
partly  have  reflected  a  new  technological  paradigm;  but  increasing  labour  shortages  in 
manufacturing strengthened  the  large engineering companies’  incentives  to bid for scarce 
(skilled) workers, while globalisation of production made large engineering companies less 
concerned  about  domestic  wage-wage  spirals.  In  addition,  stronger  preference  for 
decentralised wage bargaining among engineering companies might have reflected a growing 
resistance to general wage compression, a salient feature of Swedish wage policy from the 
mid-1960s. 
 
6. Sweden’s road from full employment 
6.1 Depression and a new economic-policy regime 
At the start of the 1990s, Sweden experienced an economic crisis without precedent in the 
earlier postwar period nor a counterpart in other OECD countries at that time, save Finland. 
Swedish GDP growth was negative during three years, 1991-1993. The recession was even 
longer and deeper in terms of GDP growth than the recession in the early 1930s and the 
employment decline was more dramatic in the early 1990s than during any other recession in 
the  history of  Swedish  industrialism  (Edvinsson, 2005, table  9.7 and 9.12). Labour force 
participation rates fell drastically in Sweden from 1990 to 1993. Furthermore, standardised 
                                         




open  unemployment  increased  from  1.7  percent  in  1990  to  9  percent  in  1993,  only  one 
percentage  point  below  the  EU  average.  Thus  Sweden  entered  the  road  to  mass 
unemployment as other OECD countries had done in the two preceding decades.  
 
The  deep  economic  crisis  in  Sweden  at  the  start  of  the  1990s  was  to  a  great  extent  a 
consequence of domestic overheating in the 1980s. In particular, enterprises in construction 
and service sectors, including real estate and financial services, had made very substantial 
investments during the credit boom of the 1980s. They were now facing reduced demand 
growth and falling stock market and real estate prices, e.g. as a consequence of increasing 
interest rates. Many enterprises, having borrowed to finance their expansion during the 1980s, 
had difficulties paying interest on loans, leading to bankruptcies and a very serious banking 
crisis. Furthermore, increased real interests and repayment of loans contributed to an increase 
in household savings during the first half of the 1990s. Higher real interest rates were an 
international phenomenon, reflecting a German reunification and a lower rate of inflation. But 
it  was  augmented  in Sweden  by weak confidence in the krona, a result of  the  country’s 
relatively high rate of inflation in the 1980s. Real interest after tax also increased in Sweden 
as a result of a tax reform in 1990-1991, which included a reduction in progressive income 
taxes and tax allowances. 
 
Swedish economic policy in the 1990s was shaped, not only by the deep recession at the 
beginning of the decade, but also by new rules of the game. In October 1990, after a large 
capital outflow from Sweden, the social democratic government announced a restrictive fiscal 
policy programme and that Sweden would apply for membership in the European Union. In 
May  1991,  the  social  democratic  government  decided  to  tie  the  krona  to  the  ECU.  The 




were ruled out. However, in the fall of 1992, the Central Bank failed to prevent a major 
outflow  of  capital  from  Sweden.  The  centre-right  (four-party)  government,  installed  in 
September 1991, decided, in consultation with the social democratic opposition, on two fiscal 
policy crisis packages to defend the krona. The crisis packages contained reduced payroll 
taxes  to  increase  Sweden’s  competitive  strength,  but  also  sizeable  budget  increases.  The 
defence of the krona failed, and in November 1992 Sweden abandoned the system of fixed 
exchange rates. In January 1993 the Central Bank settled a target of 2 per cent inflation with 
an allowed flexibility of 1 percentage point in either direction; the inflation taget began to 
apply from January 1995. The Central Bank had gradually become more independent from 
the mid-1980s; the formal decision of independence was taken in 1998 after a constitutional 
change. In addition, in the mid-1990s, Sweden adopted, as many other Western countries, 
strict  rules  for  fiscal  policy  as  recommended  by  the  new  consensus  in  economics.  Far-
reaching deregulation, especially of product markets, in the 1990s was also in conformity with 
the new consensus. Sweden switched to a new, general, economic-policy regime in the 1990s 
although  some  deregulation  had  already  taken place  in  the  middle  of the  1980s  (see  the 
deregulation  of  credit  markets)  and  economic  policy  still  contained  Keynesian  and  R-M 
elements. 
 
6.2 The Rehn-Meidner programme under a new economic-policy regime 
High unemployment in the 1990s was an obvious Swedish departure from the goals of the R-
M model. What is more, after a steady decline in 1998-2001, the rate of unemployment began 
to rise again and was in 2006, despite an economic recovery, 7 percent with a standardised 
(ILO) measure and 5.3 per cent with a conventional (national) measure (OECD Economic 
Outlook, December, 2007, table 13 and 14). Thus, in the mid-2000s, Sweden no longer met 




rates were still much lower than at the beginning of the 1990s. Neither was the goal of the 
social democratic government in 1998 to increase the employment share of the population 
aged 20-64 years to 80 percent before 2005 achieved. Labour force participation was not at 
stake when the R-M model was developed, but the decline in Swedish participation rates in 
the 1990s and 2000s, although from a high rate, was certainly a failure in light of the model. 
However, Swedish employment failures do not necessarily mean that policy makers had given 
up the high ambitions of full employment or abondened the mechanisms of the R-M model. 
 
The non-socialist four-party government 1991-1994 used the concept of “the only way” to 
dissociate  its  economic  policy  from  the  third  way  of  the  social  democrats.  However,  by 
opposing expansionary fiscal policy and devaluations to achieve low rates of unemployment, 
the only way was a continuation, although more explicitly, of a challenge to the Keynesian 
post-war  model  that  had  been  started  in  the  early  1980s  and  expanded  under  a  social 
democratic government in the early 1990s. The attempts by a social democratic, and then by a 
non-socialist, government to raise confidence in the krona in the early 1990s was actually in 
accordance with the R-M policy of attaining price stability and enhancing economic growth. 
Consequently  the  Swedish  abandonment  of  the  system  of  fixed  exchange  rates,  and  the 
reduction of payroll taxes, might be looked upon as a dismantling of the R-M policy to fight 
inflation  and  stimulate  growth.  However,  the  inflation  target  for  the  Central  Bank  can 
simultaneously be seen as a device, in the spirit of the R-M model, to create a price-stabilizing 





Fiscal policy (for the whole public sector) was more expansionary in 1992 than the year 
before in spite of the intention of the non-socialist government to be restrictive.
48 A large 
increase in the Swedish public deficit was the result both of a depression (through automatic 
stabilisers) and, more importantly, of a looser fiscal policy. Among other things, commercial 
banks were offered huge grants in the aftermath of the deep financial crisis. Despite crisis 
packages and the centre-left government’s ambition to reduce the public budget deficit, fiscal 
policy (for the entire public sector) was still expansionary in 1993-1994 and not even tighter 
in 1993. Fiscal policy contributed significantly to a Swedish public budget deficit in 1993 that 
was larger than in all other OECD countries with the exception of Greece. Fiscal policy was 
then  tightened  in  1994  but  Swedish  fiscal  policy  was,  although  not  deliberately, 
predominantly expansive and countercyclical during the non-socialist period 1991-1994. 
 
The  policy  along  the  only  way  had  failed  in  its  chief task  of creating  confidence  in  the 
Swedish krona. By contributing to a budget deficit fiscal policy was an important reason for 
the  currency  crisis  hitting  Sweden  in  the  fall  of  1992.  However,  the  absence  of  a 
contractionary  fiscal  policy  during  a  deep  recession  with  increasing  unemployment  was 
actually in accordance with the R-M model. Moreover, the only way of the non-socialist 
government showed, without any explicit reference, other similarities to the R-M programme. 
The  government,  like  the  R-M  model,  expressed  scepticism  concerning  incomes  policy. 
Furthermore  deregulation  of  product  markets  along  the  one  way,  for  example  of 
telecommunications, postal services and passenger air traffic, was hardly any break with the 
R-M model giving priority to market conforming measures and to policies reducing profit 
margins.
49 The non-socialist government also carried on an ambitious labour market policy 
                                         
48 Fiscal policy for the entire public sector was also countercyclical under a social democratic government during 
the dramatic downswing of 1991 (Braconier and Holden, 1999, fig. 5.2.5; OECD Economic Outlook June 2001, 





during the crisis. During the last years of the social democratic government, active labour 
market policy had in fact not been very active, despite increasing unemployment. Expenditure 
on  labour  market  policy  as  a  share  of  GDP  rose  considerably  during  the  non-socialist 
government (see Table 1 in Appendix).
50 The share of the labour force in active labour market 
programmes reached a post-war peak in 1994 (7.3 per cent).  
 
The orientation of labour market policy under the non-socialist government was almost in full 
agreement  with  the  R-M  model.  Supply  and  adjustment  oriented  measures  increased 
significantly  in  1992.  The  training  share  of  total  expenditures  and  participants  in  labour 
market  policy  was  reduced  during  the  last  two  years  of  non-socialist  government  when 
(public)  relief  work  and  the  basically  demand-oriented  work  experience  schemes  (ALU 
projects) and youth practice programmes were expanded. But supply and matching measures 
were still  the  most important part of active  labour  market policy.
51 The government  also 
introduced a universal (though temporary) system of employment subsidies in 1994. (The 
social democrats had in mid-1980s introduced a system of marginal recruitment grants, which 
was permanent though less general than the non-socialist proposal.)  
 
Non-socialist employment policy measures might still have been too limited according to the 
R-M model.
52 However the most serious challenge to the model in the 1990s was to come 
from the social democrats. The social democratic government, taking over in September 1994, 
                                                                                                                               
49 Decisions by the non-socialist government were the prime reason behind a radical deregulation of product 
markets in Sweden in the 1990s (Erlandsen and Lundsgaard, 2007). 
 
50 Spending on active labour market policy was also high in Sweden compared to other OECD countries in the 
first half  of the  1990s, especially  if adjusted for the rate  of unemployment (Nickell, 1997, table  4; OECD 
Employment Outlook, various issues). 
 






was to implement the fiscal restraint that the non-socialist government had first applied the 
same  year.
53  The  party  that  had  pioneered  the  Keynesian  revolution  now  introduced  an 
extremely restrictive fiscal policy in a situation of mass unemployment. The social democratic 
fiscal restraint 1995-1998, with Göran Persson first as Minister of Finance (1994-1996) and 
then  as  Prime  Minister,  has  no  equivalent  in  other  OECD  countries  in  the  period  of 
comparative statistics from 1970 and onward.
54 In 1998, the public budget deficit disappeared 
thanks  to  an  international  recovery  and,  above  all,  a  tighter  fiscal  policy.  Moreover,  the 
Central Bank, governed by its inflation target, pursued tight monetary policy from 1995 until 
the  beginning  of  1997.  Restrictive  macroeconomic  policy  in  a  situation  of  mass 
unemployment was inconsistent, not only with Keynesianism, but also with the R-M model. 
 
However, the social democratic Cabinet, like the previous non-socialist government, engaged 
in an ambitious labour market programme. In line with the priorities of the R-M model, public 
relief work became gradually less important from the mid-1980s until 2006. In 1996 and 
1997, the demand-oriented ALU projects involved more people than the training programmes 
in  labour  market  policy.  This  development  could  be  seen  as  a  deviation  from  the  R-M 
programme in a situation of excess demand for highly skilled people in the Swedish economy 
(see particularly the IT-boom in Sweden in the late 1990s). But from 1998, participating in 
labour  market  training  was  again  to  dominate  labour  market  policy,  if  programmes  for 
handicapped people are excluded. The remarkable "Knowledge Boost” (Kunskapslyftet) 1997-
                                                                                                                               
52 Furthermore, cuts in taxes on capital by the non-socialist government were probably a break with the strong 
emphasis on equity in the R-M model.   
 
53 The restrictive policy of the social democrats was to a larger extent constituted by higher income taxes than 
the non-socialist government’s only way. Employment had fallen drastically in the public sector in the years of 
the non-socialist government.The social democrats received support in Parliament for their fiscal restraint, first 
from Vänsterpartiet and then (from January 1995) from Centerpartiet. From Autumn 1998, they were supported 
by Vänsterpartiet and Miljöpartiet (the Green Party).  
 
54 Price and Muller, 1984, table 1; OECD Economic Outlook June 1997, 2001, table 31 and June 2005, table 30; 




2002, to increase the level of education and to reduce unemployment among adults with only 
grammar  school  education,  was  also  in  line  with  the  supply-oriented  R-M  model.  The 
programme engaged 10 percent of the labour force during the first four years (Albrecht et al., 
2004,  p.  1).  The  social  democratic  government  had also  introduced  a form  of  temporary 
employment subsidy in 1995 – firms recruiting unemployed were given financial assistance. 
Furthermore, the increasing weight of employment subsidies in Swedish labour market policy 
since 1998 can be regarded as a late breakthrough for a crucial feature of the R-M model. In 
1997, employment subsidy grants embraced only 1.9 per cent of all individuals engaged in 
labour market policy programmes financed by AMS and other public authorities. In 2005, this 
share had risen to 20.3 per cent.
55  
 
But the relation between the R-M model and the social democratic labour market policy from 
the mid-1990s was ambiguous. The share of the labour force engaged in labour market policy 
programmes steadily decreased until 2004. Swedish expenditures on labour market policy in 
proportion to GDP showed a similar decline. The weaker emphasis on labour market policy 
by  the  social  democrats  largely  reflected  better  labour  market  conditions.  But  in  2000 
expenditure on active labour market policy programmes as a share of GDP became lower in 
Sweden than in Denmark and the Netherlands, two countries with less unemployment than 
Sweden.
56 It cannot be discounted that Sweden’s lower ranking is explained by the increasing 
weight of employment policy measures under public authorities other than the AMS (see the 
“Knowledge Boost” in particular). However, the lower priority of AMS programmes meant 
that the government was not prepared to meet increasing unemployment in the early 2000s or 
                                         
55 Statistics Sweden, 2005, table 356 and 2008, table 353, see also Appendix 1. 
 
56 See OECD Economic Outlook, various issues, Table H. Further, in the period 1999-2002, subsidies to regular 
employment in the private sector recommended by Rehn and Meidner were higher in Belgium, Italy and Spain 
than in Sweden as a share of GDP. This share was also approximately as high in Finland, France and Canada as 




the slow employment recovery in the following export-led expansion. Furthermore, from the 
late 1990s, employment subsidy programmes, and also other labour market policy measures, 
have  targeted  long-term  unemployed  and  older  people,  a  clear  break  with  the  universal 
employment policy of the R-M model.
57 Also the social democratic scheme of employment 
subsidies in 1995 could have been criticised on R-M grounds for its non-universal character, 
subsidies were paid to the unemployed only. (By being given also for the re-employed the 
subsidies were not even marginal.) 
 
The relation between some labour market reforms from the mid-1990s and the R-M model 
was also ambiguous. In 1995 the social democratic government decided on further reductions 
in  unemployment  benefits;  the  replacement  ratio  was  reduced from  80  to  75  per  cent  in 
January 1996. The non-socialist government had reduced the replacement ratio in 1993, from 
90 to 80 per cent. The social democrats also made exceptions from the Job Security Act of 
1974 by allowing short-time employment contracts (1996) and exclusion of two individuals in 
companies with fewer than 10 employees from the principle of last-in first-out (2001). The R-
M model seems to be compatible with the exceptions from the Job Security Act but not with 
the reductions of replacement ratios from the mid-1990s. However, the pre-1996 replacement 
rate (80 per cent) was restored in 1997, among other things as a result of a budget surplus for 
central  government.  Furthermore,  a  labour  market  reform  in  2001-2002  satisfied  the 
“flexicurity”  principle  of  the  R-M  model.  It  intended  not  only  to  increase  effective 
replacement  rates  but  also  to  stimulate  labour  market  flexibility  by  reductions  of 
unemployment benefits over time.
58 The benefit ceiling was raised though primarily for the 
first  20  weeks  of  unemployment.  Recipients  were  allowed  to  restrict  search  to  their 
                                         
57 Since 2000 training programmes have largely been substituted by special counselling and placement measures 





occupation and local labour market  – which  made the system  more  generous (at least  in 
theory) – but only during the first 20 weeks of unemployment (Bennmarker et al. 2007, pp. 
88-92).  
 
An ambiguity attached to the relation between the R-M model and the macroeconomic policy 
of  the  social  democrats  after  the  consolidation  of  the  public  budget.  The  government 
introduced  some  disciplinary  budget  reforms,  which  can  be  seen  as  an  unconscious 
application of the model. In 1995 the social democrats decided to introduce a ceiling for 
expenditures by central governments, effective from 1997. The ceiling covered all items in the 
national budget including social insurance (but excluding interest on the government debt). In 
addition,  from  1997,  the  social  democrats  had  a  fiscal  policy  target  that  required  the 
consolidated public budget to show a surplus of 2 percent of GDP over a business cycle. This 
budget reform was clearly in accordance with the R-M model. One motif for a public budget 
surplus over the business cycle was also in conformity with the R-M view – the surplus makes 
countercyclical fiscal policy possible without big budget deficits in a recession.
59 Moreover, 
there are arguments for not putting forth strong objections to short-run macroeconomic policy 
in Sweden from the late 1990s, using the R-M model as a norm. Fiscal policy for the entire 
public sector was restrictive, though mainly countercyclical.
60 Neither was the direction of 
Swedish  monetary  policy  from  the  late  1990s  a  serious  challenge  to  the  R-M  model, 
considering that unemployment was still high in the country. In general the policy of the 
Central  Bank  was  not  only  countercyclical  during  the  first  half  of  the  2000s,  but  also 
expansive from 1997 until 2006.  
                                                                                                                               
58 Through a ceiling on earnings eligible for unemployment benefits, nominal wage growth in 1993-2000 had 
reduced the effective replacement ratios, especially for highly-paid workers (see Bennmarker et al., 2007, p. 90). 
 
59 Ministry of Finance, 2000, pp. 29-30. But the government did not formulate a R-M argument for public 






However, a R-M criticism of the new economic policy in Sweden can still be directed towards 
the  low  employment  aspirations  in  economic  policy.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  specific 
inflation target (2 per cent inflation) defined by the Central Bank is in agreement with the 
high employment ambitions of the R-M model (cf. Lundborg and Sacklén, 2006). Moreover, 
in 1996, the social democrats set up the same goal for unemployment as in fact the former 
non-socialist government - to reduce open unemployment (national measure) to 4 percent 
before 2000. The employment policy ambition of the social democrats was satisfied, but it 
was too modest to meet the strong demands of the R-M model. Hence it seems that the 
redefinition of full employment by Bertil Ohlin and Erik Lundberg in the early post-war years 
eventually won the day.  
 
The social democratic abandonment of the goals of a very low rate of unemployment and the 
restrictive rules for macroeconomic policy were obvious challenges to Keynesianism. But 
incomes policy was reminiscent of the Keynesian post-war model in the new stabilisation-
policy regime of the 1990s (see also the countercyclical macroeconomic policy from the late 
1990). In 1990, when the economy was still overheated, the social democratic government 
had put great trust in a mediation body, the Rehnberg Commission. The commission managed 
to bring about a coordination of wage negotiations for the period 1991-1993, including almost 
all central labour market organisations. In the mid-1990s, the social democrats again brought 
the idea of incomes policy onto the political agenda, after the non-socialist parenthesis. The 
government had plans for tripartite wage negotiations, plans that were hardly compatible with 
the R-M recommendation that the trade union movement should not take responsibility for the 
stability of the national economy, especially in a situation of high profits (see below). Further, 
                                                                                                                               




the  plans  were  inconsistent  with  the  Swedish  tradition  of  wage  negotiations  without 
government intervention dating from the late 1930s (the Saltsjöbaden Agreement). However, 
the government did not realise its plans for tripartite negotiations, but instead in 2000 set up a 
separate mediation institute.  
 
In  the  first  half  of  the  1990s,  LO  and  other  parties  on  the  labour  market,  of  their  own 
initiative, had worked out a wage policy programme according to which wage increases on a 
Western European level would reduce long-term interest rates by lowering the risk premium. 
Such wage increases would also allow higher real wages through appreciations, once the 
confidence in the krona was increased, although ideally within limits to secure high profit 
shares (The Edin Group, 1995, pp. 33-4). However, LO became no part of coordinated wage 
negotiations in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s. A bargaining agreement 
between  central  labour  market  organisations  in  manufacturing,  the  so-called  Industrial 
Agreement (Industriavtalet) was signed in 1997. Agreements have been settled for three-year 
periods stipulating wage moderation in order to keep up Swedish competitive strength in 
terms of relative unit labour costs and profit margins of the exposed sector. Negotiations take 
place under the whip of the explicit inflation targets for the Central Bank (cf. Carling et al., 
2000  and  Industrins  Ekonomiska  Råd,  2003).  Today,  the  Industrial  Agreement  has 
counterparts in other sectors of the Swedish economy. The Agreement is expected to serve as 
guideline  for  wage  negotiations  outside  manufacturing.  In  fact,  since  1993,  LO  has 
persistently succeeded to coordinate wage claims for blue-collar trade unions. However wage 
coordination for individual sectors has restricted the possibility of a comprehensive wage 
policy of solidarity. Also, the Industrial Agreement has hitherto, if compared to the R-M 
recommendations, left greater emphasis on stabilisation than on distribution. Besides, there is 




growth  theory,  in  which  high  profit  margins  have  a  negative  effect  on  productivity.  The 
initiators of the agreements have also a greater faith than Rehn and Meidner in the ability of 
central labour market organisations to influence the general wage development, even in a 
situation of high profits.  
 
An obvious challenge to the priorities of the R-M model was the further increase in wage 
dispersion in Sweden in the 1990s and 2000s. In the 1990s wage dispersion increased the 
most between industries and plants, compromising fairness in the terms of the original notion 
of solidaristic wages policy.
61 As in other OECD countries there was also a continued increase 
in the dispersion of gross earnings between all workers in Sweden. From the mid-1990s to the 
mid 2000s wage differentials increased to a large extent between white-collar workers, and 
also between white-collar and blue-collar workers.
62 However, despite growing wage gaps, 
Sweden was still, together with Norway, an OECD country of extensive earnings equalisation 
in the mid-2000s (OECD Employment Outlook, 2007, table H). 
 
Another important departure from the R-M model during the 1990s and the first half of the 
2000s was the tendency to higher profit margins and a higher profits share in the business 
sector.
63 According to the model, high profit shares are undesirable from the viewpoint of 
income distribution; they also add fuel to the inflation process and restrict economic growth. 
In the first year of floating exchange rates (1993), the krona was depreciated by 25 percent 
against the currencies of competing countries. The depreciation explains, together with strong 
                                         
61  Hibbs and Locking, 2000, figure 1; Nordström Skans et al., 2006, table 1 and figure 3. 
 
62 Lundborg, 2005; Nordström Skans et al., 2006, table 1; Erixon, 2008, appendix 2. 
 
63 In fact, the increase in the profits share in manufacturing from the mid-1970s to the early 2000s was arguably 
stronger in Sweden, Finland and Canada than in other OECD countries (see Appendix 2). Moreover, effective 
tax rates on new investment were lower in Sweden than in most OECD countries in the mid-2000s (OECD, 




productivity  growth  and  higher  rates  of  unemployment,  why  the  profit  share  in  Swedish 
manufacturing rose to higher levels in the mid-1990s (above 40 per cent) than ever before in 
the post-war period. (I disregard here the profit boom during the Korean War.) What is more, 
the profit share remained at a high level despite a falling rate of unemployment in 1998-2001. 
Profits were consolidated by continuing productivity increases, and by a weaker krona in 
1996-2001 which particularly mitigated the profit fall in the recession of the early 2000s. 
Improved business-cycle conditions and continued strong productivity increases resulted in a 
new profit boom in 2005-2006. Higher unemployment compared to earlier decades was a 




6.4. New circumstances for the Rehn-Meidner model  
In conclusion, the relationship between the economic and wages policy of the 1990s and 
2000s  and  the  R-M  model  is  fraught  with  contradictions.  There  are  signs  that  social 
democratic, as well as non-socialist, governments had taken over - without reference to the 
model  -  its  basic  idea  of  stabilisation;  that  full  employment  must  be  reached  within  the 
framework of a restrictive macroeconomic policy. Explicit inflation and budget targets, and 
also Central Bank independence, could be seen as price-stabilising frameworks for an active 
employment policy. Social democratic and non-socialist governments pinned their hopes on 
labour market policy in the 1990s, that is during a decade when theories of the limitations of 
interventionist economic policy received their definite breakthrough. It seems that an active 
employment policy had been institutionalised in Sweden in the post-war period making a 
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1998, pension reform agreement between the social democratic government and the non-socialist opposition 
reduced the element of public saving in the Swedish social insurance system. In the mid-2000s, securities and 
shares owned by individuals, but administrated by a national authority (PPM), were responsible for more than 





challenge to this policy on either ideological or economic grounds a risky political project. 
However, the inflation target of the Central Bank was probably too demanding to satisfy the 
high employment ambitions of the R-M model. The restraining fiscal and monetary policy in 
the mid-1990s in a situation of mass unemployment was the clearest expression of a departure 
from the priorities and means of the R-M model. More targeted measures and less expenditure 
on labour market policy as a share of GDP from the mid-1990s, despite high, and, in the early 
2000s, increasing unemployment were other violations of the ideas of Rehn and Meidner. A 
continuing wage spread in itself and a voluntary incomes policy without strong redistributive 
ambitions were further deviations from the R-M model in the 1990s and early 2000s. From 
the viewpoint of the model there was also an unwarranted boost in the profits share of GDP. 
But it remains to be explained why Sweden deviated from some goals and means of the R-M 
model in the period under review. 
 
The  deep  recession  of  the  early  1990s  made  it  more  difficult  to  bring  down  Swedish 
unemployment by labour market policy programmes.
65 Moreover, the depth, and also date, of 
the  economic  and  financial  crisis  in  Sweden,  occurring  in  a  period  of  turbulent  global 
financial markets, explained the sudden change to and also maintenance of flexible exchange 
rates in the country. For example, Denmark and Norway, which experienced earlier and also 
milder  economic  crises  than  Sweden,  chose  to  keep  a  system  of  fixed  exchange  rates 
(Danmark) or a system of flexible exchange-rate goals (Norway until 2001). The shift to 
flexible  exchange  rates  in  Sweden  was  critical  for  the  R-M  model  since  it  reduced  the 
possibility of predicting and controlling profits. From a R-M perspective, high profits through 
depreciations of the krona generated extensive wage drift and tendencies towards wage-wage 
                                         
65 However, the sheer volume of labour market policy and the postponement of a restrictive fiscal policy are 
salient reasons why open unemployment was kept lower in Sweden than in Finland that also had been plagued 




spirals  in  the  mid-1990s  that  were  only  checked  by  a  high  rate  of  unemployment. 
Furthermore,  the  change  to  flexible  exchange  rates  had  given  fiscal  policy  –  a  strategic 
macroeconomic  variable  in  the  original  R-M  model  –  a  subordinate  role  in  stabilisation 
policy. The neutralisation of fiscal policy, hitting also the Keynesian post-war model, was 
accentuated by a continuing globalisation of financial markets and a complete abolition of 
Swedish currency controls in 1989. 
 
The Swedish disappointment cycle hit the Keynesian post-war model rather than the R-M 
model in the early 1990s. The common view among leading politicians and economists was 
that devaluations and expansionary fiscal policy in the 1970s and the 1980s had maintained 
high  employment  with  artificial  respiration,  exacerbated  inflation  and  fostered  a  deep 
economic crisis.
66 The negative review of Keynesian stabilisation policy in the 1970s and 
1980s was not completely fair. The rate of inflation in Sweden was only substantially higher 
than  the  OECD  and  EU  total  between  1988  and  1991.  Moreover,  with  a  benevolent 
interpretation, the Keynesian post-war model can be connected with measures to alleviate 
severe  overheating.  Furthermore,  OECD  estimates  show  that  almost  40  per  cent  of  the 
Swedish public deficit 1991-1994 reflected low activity levels rather than lax fiscal policies.
67 
But more important, the Swedish disappointment cycle in the first half of the 1990s did not 
primarily challenge the R-M model whose application had meant a tighter macroeconomic 
policy in the 1980s resulting in smaller public deficits in the first half of the 1990s. The model 
was also a point of reference for the Swedish Productivity Commission (1989-1991) which 
blamed Sweden’s low growth rate in the 1980s on too a weak transformation pressure. The 
commission emphasised that the devaluations had delayed structural change and obstructed 
                                         
66 One argument was that the Keynesian “accommodation policy” had, by enhancing inflation expectations, 
resulted in a gap between Swedish and German long-term interest rates in 1990-1991. Analogously, politicians 
in all camps and their economic advisors maintained that the following Swedish public deficits contributed to a 




the development and use of new products, technologies and work organisations in Swedish 
manufacturing  (Erixon  1991;  Swedish  Productivity  Commission,  1992).  In  fact,  in  her 
tenacious defence of a fixed krona, and also opposition to reduced payroll taxes, the Finance 
Minister  of  the  non-socialist  government,  Anne  Wibble,  referred  to  the  need  for 
transformation pressure to increase economic growth (Swedish Economic Association, 1991, 
pp. 76-7). 
 
This is not to say that the R-M model was not a target in the disappointment cycle of the early 
1990s. Swedish economists began to criticise labour market policy on empirical grounds for 
being ineffective and inflationary (Erixon, 2000, pp. 66-9). The passive labour market policy 
of the social democrats in 1990-1991 was seen by some observers as a confirmation that the 
party had downgraded the priority of full employment and also espoused economists’ critical 
view of active labour market policy (SOU 1993:43, pp. 38-9 and 47). This conclusion is 
controversial. The main reason for the modest size of active labour market policy measures in 
1990-1991 was that the social democratic government was yet not aware of, or prepared to 
meet, the strong tendencies towards mass unemployment.
68 On the other hand, evaluations of 
labour  market  policies  by  economists  were  one  reason  for  why  the  social  democrats,  in 
conflict with the R-M model, put less emphasis from the mid-1990s on labour market policy 
and reallocated resources to older people and long-term unemployed to minimize deadweight 
and substitution (crowding-out) effects. Swedish economists had concluded that the positive 
                                                                                                                               
67 OECD Economic Outlook 2007, no. 81, table 29 and 30. 
 
68 According to an influential argument, the social democratic government came to prioritise the struggle against 
inflation in 1990-1991, thus giving lower priority to full employment (cf. Lindbeck, 1997, p. 1303; Jonung, 1999 
pp. 69-85; Holmlund, 2006). However, the argument is based on declarations by the government at the time 
when the Swedish economy was still overheated, or immediately after, when available information as to the 
depth of recession was still limited (Ministry of Finance, Budget Bill 1990, p. 12 and 1991, pp. 1-8). In fact, 
already in the 1950s and 1960s, social democratic governments had made a similar priority of the fight against 




employment effects of extensive labour market policy programmes in the first half of the 
1990s were either small or non-existent.
69  
 
The Swedish disappointment cycle in the 1990s was shaped by new economic theories about 
rational  expectations  and  time-inconsistencies  in  political  decision-making.  The  new 
economic ideas challenged the Keynesian post-war model, and in some respect, also the R-M 
model. In the mid-1980s leading Swedish politicians and their economic-policy advisors were 
influenced by “norm economics”, a Swedish version of the new (“neo-monetarist”) consensus 
in economics, although they had already accepted the new ideas in the early 1980s. Norm 
economists emphasised the negative experiences of Swedish “accommodation policies” and 
the  need  for  measures  to  reduce  inflation  expectations  in  the  country  by  strengthening 
confidence in fixed rates of exchange (cf. Tson Söderström et al., 1985 and Jakobsson, 2000, 
pp. 124-7). Their attitude to the R-M model was ambiguous. Some norm economists saw the 
R-M  stabilisation  policy  at  the  beginning  of  the  1970s  as  worthy  of  imitation  (Tson 
Söderström  et  al.,  1985,  pp.  36-7).  They  also  underlined  by  references  to  the  Swedish 
Productivity  Commission,  the  need  for  transformation  pressure  when  opposing  new 
devaluations and reductions of payroll taxes in the early 1990s (Tson Söderström et al., 1992, 
pp. 13-4 and 49-53). The similarities between norm policy and the R-M model, however, 
should not overshadow the fact that the norm economists were critical of coordinated wage 
bargaining and of state interventionism regarding economic policy, a criticism that also hit 
labour market policy.
70 
                                         
69 Blanchflower et al., 1995; Forslund and Krueger, 1997; Calmfors, et al., 2001; Sianesi, 2002. 
 
70 Tson Söderström et al., 1985, pp. 97-8 and 128-9. Also, by supporting a transfer of resources from the public 
to the private sector, essentially the open one, most Swedish neo-monetarists had no “structural” objections to 
the devaluations of the 1970s and 1980s. Their main criticism of the social democratic devaluation in 1982 was 
that the following fiscal spending policy was not restrictive enough to guarantee a transfer of resources to the 
private sector (Jonung, 1991, pp. 14 and 32). In spite of the devaluations, general government’s share of total 





In the mid-1990s, economic experts working for the new social democratic government began 
to refer to the NAIRU and “natural” (equilibrium) rate of unemployment, central notions of 
new macroeconomics. They agreed with leading academic economists that the equilibrium 
rate of unemployment in Sweden was above the actual rate (approximately 2 per cent) at the 
end of the 1980s, and also increasing during this decade because of higher replacement ratios 
and  less  wage  coordination.  Furthermore,  officials  in  the  Ministry  of  Finance  shared  the 
OECD view that the equilibrium rate of unemployment had increased (for unclear reasons) in 
the first half of the 1990s.
71 The social democrats therefore accepted unemployment rates 
above  3  per  cent  and  the  need  for  structural  reforms  in  the  labour  market  to  reduce 
equilibrium  unemployment.  However,  the  reduction  of  the  replacement  rate  in  the 
unemployment  insurance  system  in  the  mid-1990s  was  primarily  a  part  of  the  budget 
consolidation policy (Ministry of Finance, Revised Budget Bill 1995, p. 31).  
 
There  is  no  obvious  distance  between  the  R-M  model  and  the  concepts  of  NAIRU  and 
equilibrium unemployment in modern economics (see Erixon, 2008). But the model’s trade-
off between unemployment and inflation except under overheated conditions accords better 
with a partial rehabilitation than with an absolute rejection of the Phillips curve (cf. Akerlof et 
al., 2000 and Lundborg and Sacklén, 2006). The emphasis on price stability as a superior 
objective of economic policy in modern macroeconomics was a breach of the R-M model. 
Furthermore, new bargaining theory provided a challenge to the R-M theory in which market 
forces are fundamental in wage formation and incomes policy could be harmful for economic 
growth.  Swedish  economic-policy  advisers  began  to  use  “wage-setting”  models  to 
demonstrate that equilibrium unemployment could be reduced by responsible trade unions 





and by corporate arrangements such as the Industrial Agreement (cf. Layard et al., 1991 and 
National Institute for Economic Research, 2004, pp. 18-19). 
 
Swedish  economic  policy  in  the  1990s  and  2000s  is  also  explained  by  economic-policy 
fallacies. In fact some political failures supported the Keynesian post-war model and the R-M 
model  rather  than  the  new  economic  paradigm.  The  four-party,  non-socialist  government 
1991-1994 was too divided to embark on a fiscal policy along its own only way until 1994; 
thus, in a situation of high unemployment, the non-socialists were “neo-monetarists” in theory 
but Keynesians in practice. The decision by the following social democratic government to 
pursue an expansionary fiscal policy before the elections in 1998, 2002 and 2006 seemed a 
threat not only to the self-imposed budget goals of the government, but also to the disciplinary 
economic policy of the R-M model.
72 However, during these years, unemployment was still 
high in Sweden, and 2002 was a clear recession year, probably legitimating expansionary 
fiscal measures from the viewpoint of the R-M model. On the other hand some economic-
policy fallacies were unfavourable  to the priorities  of the model.  Incorrect predictions of 
employment and inflation developments during the first half of the 2000s made labour market 
policy less active and Central Bank’s policy less expansionary than could be expected from 
the social democrats’ employment goals and the Central Bank’s inflation target respectively. 
The rate of inflation was, as in the second half of the 1990s, systematically below the target 2 
                                                                                                                               
71 Ministry of Finance, Revised Budget Bill 1995, appendix 1.1, p. 91 and Budget Bill, 1996, appendix 1, p. 38. 
 
72 Some examples of a procyclical fiscal policy under the social democratic government, even after the mid-
1990s, reflected an accounting-book view of fiscal policy – the government declared that improvements in the 
budget balance provided room for welfare reforms and for compensation to low-income groups for earlier fiscal 
restraints (Ministry of Finance, Budget Bill 1998, pp. 19-20; Revised Budget Bill 1998, pp. 27-8, 1999, p. 24 and 
2000, p. 19 and 2001, pp. 19-20). Both election and accounting-book considerations explain (together with 
strong pressure from LO) the decisions by the social democrats in the election year of 1998 to reduce income 
taxes and increase public expenditures, for example by rising replacement rates to their pre-1995 level leading to 





per cent and fell occasionally below the lower limit of 1 per cent (Giavazzi and Mishkin, 
2006, pp. 50, 77 and 98). 
 
The victory for a new economic paradigm in Sweden during the 1990s, departing in some 
pivotal  respects  from  the  R-M  model,  confirms  the  strong  influence  of  professional 
economists  on  Swedish  economic  policy.  While  in  opposition  the  social  democrats  had 
criticized, as  in the  early  1980s, a  non-socialist  government  for  making  the  fight  against 
inflation a priority, and for its unwillingness to see low domestic demand as the main problem 
of the Swedish economy. As late as January 1994, the party issued a proposal in Parliament 
for a Keynesian programme of private investment stimuli and government purchases. But the 
fiscal policy of the social democrats in power from September 1994 was governed by the 
view among experts in the Ministry of Finance, shared by the Minister of Finance Göran 
Persson, that the party needed to achieve the fiscal restraint that the non-socialist government 
had neither the strength nor political support to fully realize.
73 
 
A stronger position for LO over economic policy in the 1990s and 2000s would probably 
have  resulted  in  unemployment  rates  more  in  accordance  with  the  strict  claims  for  full 
employment in the R-M model. The change in power relations during these decades was 
unfavourable  to  central  trade  unions  in  general  and  to  LO  in  particular.  The  degree  of 
unionisation was still high in the country but it decreased steadily after a peak in the mid-
1990s, from 86 per cent 1995 to 77 per cent 2006 (Nelander and Lönnros, 2000, table 2 and 
diagram 8; Kjellberg, 2007). In addition the bargaining position of labour was weakened by a 
higher  rate  of  unemployment.  Moreover  SAF’s  categorical  refusals  to  participate  in 




weakened LO’s influence on wage policy and also on economic policy (see Martin, 2000). 
Furthermore,  LO  had  lost  influence  on  Swedish  economic  policy  through  its  Keynesian 
standpoint. However, an argument that globalisation had weakened the position of LO (and of 
Swedish labour in general) is contradicted by the fact that foreign production by Swedish 
companies  did  not  increase  in  relation  to  their  exports  from  Sweden  during  the  1990s 
(Ekholm and Hesselman, 2000, pp. 9-11). 
 
A  R-M  policy  of  wage  solidarity  was  prevented  in  the  1990s  and  2000s  by  continued 
industrial agreements and by the fact that redistribution was given lower priority than earlier 
in central bargaining. The room for solidarity wages policy  was  also reduced in Sweden 
during these decades through a strong tendency to local agreements between companies on 
the one hand, and local trade unions and individual workers on the other. In the second half of 
the 1990s, the wage system was more decentralised in Sweden than in Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands (Nickell et al, 2005, table 3). To a large extent, wider wage 
gaps  within  plants  and  between  all  workers  in  the  1990s  and  2000s  reflected  structural 
changes in the labour market. A global shift in labour demand through the third industrial 
revolution favoured skilled labour, particularly computer specialists and R&D personnel (cf. 
Gustavsson, 2007). In the absence of extensive training and educational programmes, which 
could  have  stimulated  the  supply  of  skilled  labour,  wage  gaps  increased  considerably  in 
Sweden in favour of some white-collar workers in the 1990s. During the second half of the 
1990s and the early 2000s the Swedish tendency to larger earnings inequality in the top half 
of the distribution also appeared in other OECD countries specialising in ICT industries or 
with a large share of ICT-related occupations (see OECD, 2007, pp. 129-131 and Erixon, 
                                                                                                                               






2008). A R-M explanation of the larger wage inequalities in Sweden from the mid-1990s is 
the increase in profits, especially in the exposed sector.
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EU  integration  had  consequences  for  Swedish  economic  policy  in  the  1990s  and  2000s. 
Already in 1992, a non-socialist government had reduced the VAT, not primarily to counter 
the  recession  but  to  adjust  to  the  tax  profile  of  the  EU  countries.  Furthermore,  Swedish 
governments of all colours felt obliged to adhere to the convergence rules of the Maastricht 
Treaty of 1991. The ambition of the social democrats to meet the Maastricht convergence 
criteria had been strengthened by the party’s participation in the campaign for membership of 
the EU, and by Sweden joining the Union in 1995 after a referendum the previous year. 
Preparing for membership in the European Monetary Union the social democratic government 
also felt compelled to follow the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997.
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It is difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions regarding the status of the R-M model in an 
increasingly politically integrated Europe. The requirements of the EU Stability and Growth 
Pact of 1997 for the member countries’ public budgets to be in balance or even show a surplus 
over  the  economic  cycle,  are  in  conformity  with  the  model.  Moreover  the  Maastricht 
convergence  rule  excluded  large  fluctuations  in  exchange  rates  and  therefore  in  profits. 
Certain aspects of the EU project contradict the R-M model. Both the Maastricht convergence 
rules and the original Stability and Growth Pact forbid public budget deficits larger than 3 per 
cent of GDP. Countries with a large public sector will have difficulties meeting the budget 
deficit constraint imposed by the Pact even if some deviations were permitted in the case of 
deep recessions; restrictive fiscal policies may even be necessary to counteract tendencies 
                                         
74 Higher profits in the 1990s may have led to larger wage differentials between plants and between firms in 
Sweden through a rent-sharing mechanism (see Arai and Heyman, 2004) but also, as emphasised in the R-M 
model, through increasing financial opportunities to compete for scarce labour. Moreover, an enlarged financial 




toward large public budget deficits, unleashed by low economic activity, through automatic 
stabilisers. A strict application of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact in Sweden would, 
therefore, be incompatible with the high employment ambitions of the R-M model. Restrictive 
fiscal policy in Sweden in the mid-1990s satisfied the EU criteria for budget discipline (and 
for the size of the public debt) but it was hardly compatible with the R-M model. 
 
EU integration contributed to the breakthrough of the new consensus about economic policy 
in Sweden but its impact on Swedish economic policy should not be exaggerated. A similar 
economic  policy  was  also  conducted  in  countries  not  restricted  by  EU  rules  for 
macroeconomic policy. It seems that the argument for an adjustment to the EU were used by 
leading  politicians  and  their  economic  experts  in  Sweden  to  legitimate  economic-policy 
reforms and measures considered as inevitable against the background of new insights in 
economics and the country’s history of high inflation. Moreover, Sweden is still outside the 
EMU – a referendum in 2003 clearly rejected a Swedish participation. 
 
7. A summary  
This paper has analysed the application of a unique model of economic and wage policy in 
Sweden, the R-M model, and also used the model as a point of departure for a survey of 
Swedish  economic  policy  in  the  post-war  period.  The  typical  Swedish  model  was  never 
consistently and consciously implemented. Yet, the 1960s and early 1970s must be seen as the 
golden  age  of  the  R-M  model;  the  model  legitimised  and  contributed  strongly  to  the 
expansion  of  labour  market  policy  and  the  practice  of  the  wages  policy  of  solidarity. 
Furthermore this period witnessed an increase in public saving, a decline in the profits share 
of  GDP  and  an  introduction  of  indirect  taxes.  It  is  possible  to  disentangle  some  unique 
                                                                                                                               




Swedish circumstances behind the application of the R-M model – the strong position for 
state  interventionism,  the  political  dominance  of  the  social  democrats,  the  innovative 
character of the R-M ideas, and the strength and priorities of LO. Swedish deviations from the 
model since the middle of the 1970s are explained by negative policy experiences, a weaker 
position and new strategy of LO, a new generation of economic-policy decision makers, new 
economic  theories  (challenging  discretionary  economic  policy),  the  growing  influence  of 
professional economists and by macroeconomic policy failures.  The break with the R-M 
model is also explained by political-institutional changes, primarily deregulation of credit 
markets (leading to overheating in the 1980s), new exchange-rate systems from the mid-1970s 
(providing  more  space  for  profit  booms  through  devaluations/depreciations)  and  less 
coordinated  wage  bargaining  (threatening  the  wage  policy  of  solidarity).  It  cannot  be 
excluded, however, that departures from the R-M model are basically explained by economic-
structural conditions. Increasing internationalisation of financial markets and large companies 
has undoubtetly weakened the position of trade unions and narrowed the room for policy 
measures squeezing profits in Sweden. The IT revolution and high demand for IT skilled 
labour have certainly contributed to widening wage gaps in the country. Furthermore, the 
definition of identical jobs - a centrepiece of the solidarity wages policy - has probably been 
complicated by the introduction of new technologies and work organisations favouring more 
decentralised and individualised wage negotiations.  
 
However this paper has played down the importance of globalisation and new technological 
paradigms, and also of EU integration, for Swedish deviations from the R-M model. The 
model was shaped  by Sweden’s position as a small open economy and the early foreign 
orientation  of  Swedish  companies.  By  arguing  for  deregulation,  labour-market  flexibility, 




industrial composition of the early post-war period. Moreover there is no clear evidence of a 
conflict between foreign production and export by Swedish multinational companies in the 
post-war  period.  A  conjecture  that  the  departure  from  central  wage  coordination  is  an 
inevitable consequence of the “crisis of fordism” is weakened by the fact that there is no 
general tendency towards less wage coordination in countries specialised in ICT products. 
Furthermore,  Swedish experiences  since  the  mid-1980s show that more decentralised and 
individualised wage bargaining has not excluded tacit agreements among LO unions, nor the 
emergence of new institutions for wage coordination. However this paper has not addressed 
the specific question whether globalisation and technical change has made the R-M model 
obsolete. 
 
Swedish economic policy since the mid-1970s can be classified as a hybrid of a Keynesian, 
R-M and “neo-monetarist” model in which active labour market policies are the recurrent R-
M  features  (see  Erixon,  2008,  appendix  1).  The  combination  of  labour  market  policies 
(including employment subsidies) with strict rules for monetary and fiscal policy since the 
early 1990s is, at least in principle, compatible with the R-M model. Perhaps paradoxical for a 
foreign  observer,  Sweden  has  been  able  to  attain  higher  productivity  growth  and  lower 
inflation  rates  than  most  other  OECD  countries  but  not  to  maintain  the  low  rates  of 
unemployment or the small wage differentials of the 1970s and 1980s. Yet the application of 
the R-M model has contributed to a situation in which low rates of unemployment and small 
wage gaps have been institutionalised in Sweden. The social democrats, that is the active 
agents behind the early Keynesian revolution and the implementation of the R-M ideas in 
Sweden, were defeated in the election in 2006 since they had contributed to, but failed to 
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Table 1:  Swedish labour market policy 1965-2003. Expenditures by the National Labour 
Market Board (AMS) on active labour policy measures of various kinds, less 
regional policy measures. Expenditures on labour market policy by AMS as a 
share of GDP and by AMS and other public authorities as a share of GDP (in 
brackets). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Year     Matching       Training       Job creation       Employment subsidies       Programs for disabled     Others       %  of  GDP 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1965       12.1
1         16.4              61.6                  -                              7.6                      2.3          0.9 
1966       13.5
1         20.1              55.3                  -                              9.0                      2.1          0.8 
67/68      11.6
1         25.8              52.4                  -                              8.6                      1.6          1.2 
68/69      11.8
1         25.3              51.0                  -                            10.6                      1.3          1.4 
69/70      15.6
1         28.9              41.1                  -                            12.7                      1.7          1.2 
70/71      13.9          30.8              36.2                  -                            17.0                      2.1          1.1(1.5) 
71/72        9.9          23.8              52.6                  -                            12.5                      1.2          1.8(2.3) 
72/73        9.5          22.3              55.5                  -                            11.9                      0.8          2.1(2.8) 
73/74      10.9          25.5              47.3                  -                            15.6                      0.7          1.6(2.2) 
74/75      13.4          27.0              35.9                  -                            22.7                      1.0         1.2(1.7) 
75/76      13.3          24.8              37.8                  -                            23.3                      0.8         1.4(1.9) 
76/77        9.0          27.6              45.3                  -                            17.5                      0.6         2.1(2.7) 
77/78        8.5          29.1              46.8                  -  
2                         15.1                      0.5         2.6(3.3) 
78/79        9.4          36.0              38.0                  -  
2                         15.9                      0.7         2.4(3.1) 
79/80      10.1           37.0             33.9                  -  
2                        18.2                       0.8         2.2(2.9)    
80/81      11.2           33.9             32.3                  -  
2                        21.8                       0.8         1.8(2.6) 
81/82      11.2           32.9             31.5                  -  
2                        23.4                       1.0         1.9(2.7) 
82/83        9.4           29.5             39.5                  -  
2                        21.1                       0.5         2.1(3.0) 
83/84        9.1           26.6             44.2                  -  
2                        19.9                       0.2          2.2(3.3) 
84/85        9.7           24.4             36.8                 8.2                        20.7                        0.2          2.1(3.1) 
85/86      13.3           27.9             31.3                 4.6                        22.8                        0.1          2.0(2.9) 
87/88      13.5           35.2             20.0                 2.8                        28.3                        0.2          1.7(2.5) 
88/89      13.7           37.1             16.5                 2.2                        30.4                        0.2          1.6(2.2) 






3      12.4           31.4            10.7                  1.2                       43.8                         0.5          (1.6) 
91/92
3        8.5           41.1            12.6                  3.7                       33.7                         0.4          (2.5) 
92/93
3        8.1           35.5            23.0                  5.5                       27.9                           -            (3.1) 
93/94
3        8.4           25.5            32.3                  7.4                       26.5                           -            (3.0) 
94/95
3        9.0           25.8            28.8                  9.0                       27.4                           -            (3.0) 
95/96
3      11.0           23.3            22.0                13.6                       30.0                         0.1           (2.4) 
1997
3       14.4           20.6            24.9                   9.6                      30.0                         0.5           (2.1) 
1998
3       14.3           23.0            25.5                   7.1                      30.1                         -               (2.0) 
1999
3       16.3           26.5            16.9                   9.4                      31.0                          -              (1.8) 
2000
3       21.9           21.2            10.2                 10.2                      36.5                          -              (1.4) 
2001
3       25.3           21.5              5.0                 12.9                      35.4                           -             (1.4) 
2002
3       15.3           29.5            11.7                 12.3                      30.7                        0.5            (1.6) 
2003
3       19.5           18.8            13.3                 11.8                      36.2                        0.4            (1.3) 
2004
3       19.2           16.0            12.0                 15.3                      34.7                        2.8            (1.3) 
2005
3       17.4           15.2            12.9                 18.2                      33.4                        2.9            (1.3) 
______________________________    




Matching activities include labour market information, geographical mobility and investigation costs. Training 
includes  labour  market  education  organized  by  AMS.  Job  creation  measures  include  youth  teams,  in-plant 
training to avoid lay-offs, trainee replacement scheme (though not financed by AMS), orders and other supports 
to industries, introduction places, measures for partial unemployment, specific job creation programs, stock-
piling subsidies, special job-design programs, relief work and trainee programs. Programs for disabled persons 
include special work-adjustment measures, vocational rehabilitation and public sheltered work. The category 
Other  includes  defence  activities,  procurement  and  administration  of  equipment  and  contributions  from  the 
European social fund. 
   
1 The share is underestimated. Some expenditure on labour information and regional mobility are counted as 
labour  market  training.  On  the  other  hand,  the  inclusion  of  expenditures  on  geographical  mobility  in  the 
matching category throughout the table is doubtful. Thus there are two arguments why the first two columns 
should be added to achieve total expenditures on supply and adjustment oriented measures. 
2 Recruitment subsidies are included in the category job creation or excluded from the table by their regional 
nature.  
3 Estimates of the composition of labour market policy for these years is based on OECD Employment Outlook 
(see also the labour market policy share of GDP in brackets). These statistics cover expenditure not only by 






Table 2:  Trends in gross profits share of gross value added in manufacturing, 10 OECD countries 1955-2003, average 
    annual  % changes 
 
  1955-2003   1955-1972   1973-2003                 
 
 
Sweden  0.04  -0.68                           0.47               
  (0.26)   (-9.30)  (3.14) 
 
Norway (1)  0.12  0.57                          0.18         
  (3.70)   (1.59)   (3.61) 
 
Finland (1)   0.23  -0.55                        0.51              
   (2.23)   (-1.90)                        (4.94) 
 
Denmark  -0.11  -0.57                        0.25              
   (-0.40)   (-1.61)  (3.95) 
 
Netherlands  -0.10  -0.37                        0.05             
  (-0.28)   (-0.92)  (0.1) 
 
Germany (2)   -0.30             -0.54                         -0.11 
  (-3.17)   (-3.52)  (-1.07) 
 
United Kingdom  0.03  -0.37                         0.29             
  (0.25)                 (-18.21)                     (3.10) 
 
USA  0.12   0.02                         0.13               
  (5.0)  (0.19)         (5.0) 
 
Canada (3)  0.13  -0.15                       0.61                
                       (3.74)   (-4.45)                      (3.65) 
 
Japan  -0.69   0.01                        -0.56                
  (-7.58)   (0.09)  (-4.64) 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________    
Source: Eurostat, OECD National Accounts Vol. II and National Statistics 
1) Initial year 1960. 2) West Germany 1955-1990. 3) Final year 2001. T–stastistics in brackets. 
 
Note: Source: Eurostat, OECD National Accounts Vol. II and National Statistics 
1) Initial year 1960. 2) West Germany 1955-1990. 3) Final year 2001. T–stastistics in brackets. 
 
Note:  The  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  test  was  used  to  decide  whether  the  time  series  of  annual  profit  shares  are 
nonstationary. The regression equations included a constant and a trend term. The augmented test was based on equations generally 
including two lagged first differences of the profit variables. Test statistics have been compared to the MacKinnon critical values for 
rejecting the hypothesis of a unit root on the 5 and 10 percent levels. In the cases of a rejection, the first differences of the profit 
variables were  regressed on a constant, representing the stochastic time trend. In  the cases where the ADF-tests were unable to 
reject  the hypothesis of  a unit  root, deterministic  trends were estimated from an equation with the  profit share as a dependent 
variable and a constant and a trend term as independent variables. These estimates were based on an ARIMA specification. 